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Abstract 
There seems to be a broad consensus in Europe that there is a European Social Model (ESM), typical 
of European societies and that this model should be protected and developed. But the ESM is an 
ambiguous notion: is it a simple description of the actual state of European societies? Is this a 
normative concept? Is it consistent with contemporary evolution marked by economic globalization 
and liberalization? Is this a political project?  
Section 1 provides an assessment of ‘the European Social Model’. This model has different patterns 
among EU-15 countries. The generally adopted classification (Esping-Andersen, 1990) sets out four 
social models in Europe: liberal, continental, Scandinavian and Mediterranean. Are the four models 
variants of a single ESM?   
Section 2 compares their economic and social performances. The best economic performances are 
obtained by the Liberals and the Scandinavian countries; Scandinavian countries have also the best 
social performance. The economic performances of continental model countries are poor. Are they 
condemned to evolue to the liberal model, or can they move towards the Scandinavian model? Can 
this model be implemented in all larger open, heterogeneous and with high unemployment countries?  
Section 3 discusses the need to adapt the ESM to new economic and social challenges: the ageing of 
populations, the rising trend in health spending, the change in family structures, the rising trend in 
social exclusion, the persistence of mass unemployment in some countries, of low fertility rates in 
some others. The section presents the actual debates, national or European, about reforms of pension 
system, health system, unemployment benefits, family policy and anti-poverty flight. 
Section 4 presents the actual situation of ‘Social Europe’. This expression may refer to the current 
actions of European Institutions. It may also refer to a political project: increasing gradually the level 
of Europe’s intervention in social fields. But the objective may be to ‘modernise social protection’, i.e. 
to reduce its field and costs, or on the contrary to progressively implement common social norms in all 
Member States in order to  reach a high and similar social protection level. The single market makes it 
more and more difficult for national protection systems to coexist. The respective roles of national and 
European institutions in the evolution of the ESM (or ESMs) are discussed. The current European 
strategy - the social Agenda and the Open method of coordination (OMC) – remains disconnected 
from national debates and reforms. Can they become more democratic and more powerful? 
The conclusion presents two views on the future of the ESM. The first suggests a new architecture of 
welfare states in Europe, inspired by the Scandinavian model, so the impact of social protection as a 
productive factor increases. The second stresses the importance of guaranteeing social cohesion in the 
Member States, by reducing income inequalities and ensuring a high level of social protection. Yet, 
the improvement of the European economic framework and the development of the Social Europe are 
not technical issues. They require a major change in the economic policy thinking and a new alliance 
between social classes concerned about full employment and social cohesion. 
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JEL classification: H50, 130. 
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EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL(S) AND SOCIAL EUROPE * 
 
Introduction 
This text aims at providing an analysis of the European Social Model – or European Social 
Models(s) – and to draw future prospects for Social Europe. European societies are based on a 
compromise between on the one hand capitalism, private ownership and market strengths, and 
on the other hand, socialism, redistribution and public production. A substantial part of 
households’ consumption is public (education, health); some risks are collectively insured 
(unemployment, health care, old-age, family, poverty); income redistribution is substantial 
through taxation and social protection. Labour legislation sets the framework of employment 
relations in the workplace, wage settings and dismissal procedures. There seems to be a broad 
consensus among EU (political or social) leaders that there is a European Social Model 
(ESM), typical of European societies and that this model should be protected and developed. 
But the ESM is an ambiguous notion (see Jepse and Serrano Pascual, 2005): is it a simple 
description of the actual state of European societies (which are diverse and evolving)? In this 
case, the concept has no specific content since it must encompass very different models, the 
UK, such as Sweden and Italy. Is this a normative concept: a market economy compatible 
with social cohesion, a minimum level of inequality, the social coverage of basic needs? Is 
this ideal scheme is achievable? Is it consistent with contemporary evolution marked by 
economic globalization and liberalization? Is this a political project? But what is its precise 
content? What are the social forces who support this project? Is that the goal of the European   
construction or a project among others? 
Section 1 provides an assessment of ‘the European Social Model’. This model has different 
patterns among EU-15 countries1. The generally adopted classification (Esping-Andersen, 
1990) sets out four social models in Europe: liberal, continental, Scandinavian and 
Mediterranean. This disparity raises two questions:  
- Are the four models variants of a single ESM? For instance, does the liberal model 
belong to the ESM?  
- Should we put these four models on the same level or must we class them in terms of 
economic performances and social cohesion? What features of these models should be 
generalised in Europe or, on the contrary, abolished? Can we invent a European model that 
would pick out the best elements in all models or is it? Should European Institutions protect 
the national specificities or should they try to make the existing models converge? 
In its “Golden Age” after World War II, Europe was a economic and social success story: 
Europe had substantially narrowed the gap in living standards vis-à-vis the United States; 
European welfare states combined strong growth, low unemployment and a solid social safety 
net in these years. Since the mid-1990s, Europe has performed rather poorly: Economic 
growth and productivity growth were lower than in the past and lower than in the US. 
                                                 
* This text is a development of the chapter “European Social Model(s) and Social Europe” of the Euroframe 
report of autumn 2007. Section 1 and 2 used the contribution of Güger, Leoni and Walterskirchen (2007). 
1 We discus here Social protection issues in the EU15 countries and do not deal with the New Members States 
issues. 
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Unemployment has been persistently high. In the last decade fact, economic performance was 
diverse:  while both liberal market economies with a low level of state interference and the 
Scandinavian countries with high taxation and large welfare states performed well, large 
continental European economies fell behind. According to a widespread view, the continental 
model can be held responsible for the poor performances of the Euro area and needs to evolve 
towards the liberal or the Scandinavian model (see Sapir, 2005).  Section 2 compares the 
economic and social performances of the different groups of EU countries, using economic 
(output growth, unemployment) and social indicators (poverty rates, income inequality). 
When social indicators are taken in account, the position of continental countries looks more 
positive, although remaining clearly below the performance of Scandinavian countries. What 
specificities of the continental model need to be corrected? Can the Scandinavian model be 
implemented in all larger open, heterogeneous and with high unemployment countries?  
Section 3 discusses the need to adapt the ESM to new economic and social challenges: the 
ageing of populations, the rising trend in health spending, the change in family structures, the 
rising trend in social exclusion, the persistence of mass unemployment in some countries, of 
low fertility rates in some others. In face of rising trends in spending, should European 
models become more liberal, target social protection on the poor or should they remain 
universal, even if this would require some rise in contribution rates? How to combine social 
cohesion (hence low inequalities) and work incentives? How to raise female, older workers 
and socially excluded employment rates without increasing poverty among the unemployed? 
Should we make effort to increase the employment rates, at any cost, or should we use a part 
of productivity gains to reduce working hours? The section presents the actual debate, 
national or European, about reforms of pension system, health system, unemployment 
benefits, family policy and anti-poverty flight. 
Section 4 presents the actual situation of ‘Social Europe’. This expression is also ambiguous. 
It may refer to the current actions of European Institutions in social areas, which are limited 
by the subsidiarity principle and by European Treaties, where social issues remain mainly at 
the National level. It may also refer to a political project: increasing gradually the level of 
Europe’s intervention, so that there will be a social Europe tomorrow like there is a monetary 
Europe today. But this project may try to ‘modernise social protection’, i.e. to reduce its field 
and costs to bring it more in line with the norms of a global world economy, or on the 
contrary to progressively implement common social norms in all Member States in order to  
reach a high and similar social protection level.  
Section 5 deals with the respective roles of national and European institutions in the evolution 
of the ESM (or ESMs). The single market makes it more and more difficult for national 
protection systems to coexist: the EU has until now only organised the coexistence through 
systems coordination. There are three incentives for moving beyond: the functioning of the 
single market would be facilitated, European citizenship would be strengthened, risks of 
social competition would be reduced. But how move from systems based on domestic 
foundations to a European system? Are European citizens ready for a European solidarity? 
Europe must choose between five strategies. The liberal strategy is to let social concurrence 
play. The sovereignist strategy aims to let each country to choose its social system. The 
strategy of social Europe seeks to promote social convergence with the gradual establishment 
of binding common social objectives. The strategy of the big bang seeks to explicitly organize 
a future fusion of national systems. The current European strategy to influence the evolution 
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of the national socials systems - the social Agenda and the Open method of coordination 
(OMC) – is based on two non-binding pillars: the definition of common objectives and the 
exchange of good practices.  But these procedures remain disconnected from national debates 
and reforms. Can they become more democratic and more powerful?  
In conclusion, two views are presented on the future of the ESM. The first suggests a new 
architecture of welfare states in Europe, inspired by the Scandinavian model, so the impact of 
social protection as a productive factor increases. The second stresses the importance of 
guaranteeing social cohesion in the Member States, by reducing income inequalities and 
ensuring a high level of social protection, in particular for people who cannot work, because 
of their age, their handicap, their family situation or the economic situation. The disincentive 
effect of social protection is judged of second order and it is considered that rich countries can 
accept it. Yet, the improvement of the European economic framework and the development of 
the Social Europe are not technical issues. They require a major change in the economic 
policy thinking and a new alliance between social classes concerned about full employment 
and social cohesion. 
1. From one to four models 
The basic principle of the ESM is that society has to provide each individual with some basic 
goods and services (education, health) and that it should ensure everyone has a minimum vital 
income, that everyone is protected against some risks (sickness, unemployment, old-age), that 
some redistribution must be done in favour of some categories of the population (families, 
disabled people), that everyone can earn their living through a paid job, with decent working 
conditions and some degree of job protection. Labour Law and social dialogues regulate wage 
setting, relations in the workplace and lay-off procedures. By supporting social cohesion, by 
ensuring that important parts of the population are not durably excluded from the productive 
life, by ensuring a minimal level of education and health, by supporting compatibility 
between work and childcare, social protection is a productive factor. But, it necessarily 
weakens incentives to work and thus the size of the system is a delicate trade-off between 
fairness, social efficiency and individual incentives.   
Should this trade-off change over time? According to a first view point, rising living 
standards should translate into lower work dependence; social protection should rise over 
time; productivity gains should pave the way for more leisure time and therefore economic 
inactivity. A rising share of economic inactivity should be financed through social protection: 
disabled people, old-age pensioners, child care. This trend took place until the early 1980’s 
and has since then been reversed. Today’s mainstream view is that work should pay and that 
people have both rights and responsibilities, that benefit entitlement needs to be conditional 
on duties towards the Society. Liberal ideas and globalisation constraints plead for reducing 
the weight of taxation. A major objective of the reform of social systems is to give people 
incentives to work and to work longer (workfare). Should social protection aim at ensuring 
that everyone has decent incomes or make sure that everyone is able to get decent earnings 
form their work? The issue is all the more delicate since most continental European countries 
still have a high level of unemployment:  when the demand for labour is not sufficient, it is 
not useful to prompt to a sharp increase in the labour supply and unfair to penalize those who 
do not work  
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Social protection was originally highly connected with trade unions, and move progressively 
toward a universal coverage, more satisfactory in terms of social cohesion. Workers 
financially support the economically inactive, while at the same time the system provides 
insurance for active people (sickness, family, unemployment, pensions). The solidarity 
function was included in the social insurance system. But this system is fragile: workers may 
refuse to pay for the inactive and may prefer occupational systems.  
Until the early 1980’s, the ESM had also the objective of supporting economic growth and 
maintaining full-employment through fiscal and monetary policies. This ambition weakened 
in the 1980’s when the reduction of inflation and macroeconomic stability became priority 
objectives in Europe, rather than full-employment that seemed impossible to maintain.  
Social protection systems are extremely heterogeneous in the EU, which reflect different 
histories and different organisations of social relations. Each country manages risks in its own 
way. In the tradition of Esping-Andersen (1990), four models are generally considered:  
– The Scandinavian (or Nordic or social-democratic) model is the most comprehensive one, 
with a high degree of emphasis on redistribution, social inclusion and universality. 
Uniform and relatively high level of social protection is entitled to all citizens, meaning 
that dependence of the individual on the market and on his work is lowest. They are 
complemented by occupational benefits agreed by social partners and covering almost all 
the labour force. A generous infrastructure of social services is designed to be both 
affordable and of high quality. High replacement rates of unemployment benefits and the 
health system are financed through the tax system. Taxation is very progressive while 
business taxes are rather low. Job protection is rather low but unemployment allowances 
are high with an active policy of reintegration in employment. Trade unions are strongly 
involved in the administration of unemployment insurance and training. The Scandinavian 
countries have been successful in generating high employment rates, especially for female 
and older workers ad at reducing gender inequalities in the labour market especially for 
female and older workers. A strong social dialogue and close cooperation of the social 
partners with the government characterise the countries that can be subsumed under this 
ideal-type (Denmark, Finland and Sweden).  
– The liberal (or Anglo-Saxon) model emphasises the responsibility of individuals for 
themselves. A minimal social protection is afforded to the poor and is complemented by 
company or private insurance.  Social transfers are smaller than in the other models, more 
targeted and “means tested”. Accordingly, social policies usually cater to a clientele 
consisting of low-income groups. The state encourages market actors to co-provide 
services, and leaves recipients with the choice to opt between public and private 
providers. Private insurance and savings schemes are frequently supported by 
complementary state policies (e.g., tax credits, tax shelters). The labour market is not 
regulated; labour relations are decentralised and bargaining takes place primarily at the 
firm level. Unemployment allowances are low and only slightly over the subsistence 
minimum. Employment rates are high. Taxation is relatively low. The Anglo-Saxon 
model is typified in Europe by the United Kingdom and Ireland.   
– In the Continental European model of social insurance: social protection is organised on 
occupational basis and aims at guaranteeing wage incomes.  Accordingly, transfers are 
financed through employers’ and employees’ contributions. The redistributive efforts of 
the fiscal system are less pronounced than in Scandinavian countries. Social partners play 
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an important role in industrial relations and wage bargaining is centralised. The model 
includes strong job protection and generous unemployment allowances. The employment 
rate is relatively low. The tax-to-GDP ratio is high. This is the model in Germany, France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria.  
– In the Mediterranean model, the low level of social transfers is partly counterbalanced by 
the strong supportive role of family networks. Families still play a significant role in the 
provision of security and shelter; these countries maintain some aspects of a paternalistic 
society, especially pronounced gender inequalities. If old-age benefits are high, family and 
anti-poverty benefits are low. Female employment rates are very low and the total 
employment rate is low. Job protection is very high but unemployment allowances are 
low. The Mediterranean group of countries includes Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece.  
Table 1.1. Social protection public expenditures 
As a percentage of GDP 
 1980 1990 1998 2006 
Austria 26.9 28.2 30.0 29.5 
Belgium 30.0 28.0 28.9 29.6 
France 27.3 29.3 32.0 33.2 
Germany 25.6 23.5 29.7 29.7 
Netherlands 30.6 29.7 23.6 26.2 
Average(1) 27.0 26.2 29.8 30.5 
Greece .. 19.4 23.7 23.9 
Spain ..    23.8 (2) 22.4 23.0 
Italy .. 27.0 27.3 29.0 
Portugal 13.4 17.3 21.8 27.5 
Average(1) .. .. 24.9 26.3 
Denmark 33.9 33.5 34.8 33.2 
Finland 22.5 28.6 31.6 30.1 
Sweden     42.5 (3)  37.6 35.9 
Average(1)   35.2 33.6 
Ireland .. 21.1 18.2 18.6 
UK 22.6 21.7 24.3 26.4 
Average(1)  21.7 23.9 25.8 
(1) Weighted averages. (2) In 1995. (3) In 1993.  
Source: Eurostat. 
 
This breakdown into four models is not so clear cut when one looks at country level into more 
detail. Some countries have characteristics of both continental and Scandinavian countries 
(the Netherlands, Austria). Domestic specificities are very strong: for instance the Finnish 
pension system is very different from the Swedish one, although the two countries are 
generally considered as Scandinavian ones. France and Germany are continental countries, 
but they run different policies in many fields like family benefits. The UK health system is 
not typical of a liberal model.  
The distinction needs to be refined according to the risk: relatively relevant for old age, much 
less relevant for family and health benefits. Systems have changed over time: health and 
family allowances have become universal in almost all countries; minimum incomes have 
been introduced in most continental countries.  
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Globally the differences between the four models remain (see Table 1.1). Social protection 
public spending amounts to 33% of GDP in Scandinavian countries, 30% in continental 
countries, 26% in Mediterranean countries and 23% in liberal countries. The Netherlands is 
the only country where the share of social protection spending has been significantly reduced. 
On the contrary, Portugal has converged towards continental countries and the share of social 
protection spending has risen in the UK.  
An analysis of expenditure per function reveals divergences both between models and within 
models (see Table 1.2): 
– Anglo-Saxon countries spend little on old-age pensions, continental countries quite a lot. 
The picture is more contrasted for other models. Italy spends quite a lot on pensions, 
Spain very little. Swedish spending on pensions differs widely from the Finnish one.  
- Health spending is low in Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon countries; high in continental 
ones. 
- Incapacity benefits are high in the Scandinavian model, also in the Netherlands and to a 
lesser extent in Portugal and the UK. On the contrary, this category of expenditure is low 
in Mediterranean countries, in Ireland and in France. 
- Family allowances are high in Scandinavian countries; this is also the case for continental 
countries (except for the Netherlands). By contrast, spending is low in Mediterranean 
countries.  
- Unemployment allowances are high in the Scandinavian countries (despite low 
unemployment rates). This is the opposite in Mediterranean countries.  
- Poverty benefits vary quite substantially within the models. 
From 1992 to 2003 (table 1.3), the rise in social protection expenditure (by 1.7 percentage 
point of GDP) was due mainly to higher old-age spending (1.1 percentage point), health (0.5) 
and family (0.3) while the weight of unemployment spending, was diminishing (0.5).  
- Old-age spending rose in almost all countries and especially rapidly in Portugal, in a 
catching-up process. It remained stable in the Netherlands while it hardly rose in Spain and 
decreased in Ireland, two high growth countries. 
- Health spending rose rapidly in France, despite a rather high initial level, to a smaller 
extent in the UK and in catching-up countries (Greece, Portugal). 
- Scandinavian countries and the Netherland have reduced significantly the level incapacity 
spending.  
- Family spending rose in Germany and Italy whereas it was being reduced in Scandinavian 
countries. 
- Unemployment spending declined in line with unemployment in Scandinavian countries, 
the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. 
- Spending targeted at reducing poverty and social exclusion fall in Sweden but rose in 
France, the Netherlands and  Greece. 
- All in all, some elements of convergence emerged at the level of the risks, although 
domestic specificities remain. 
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Table 1.2. Social protection expenditures in 2003 
As a percentage of GDP 
 Total Old-age Health Incapacity Family Unempl. Exclusion 
Austria 29.5 14.2 7.3 2.5 3.2 1.8 0.5 
Belgium 29.7 13.2 8.0 2.0 2.3 3.7 0.5 
France 30.9 13.4 9.4 1.5 2.8 2.4 1.4 
Germany 30.2 13.0 8.4 2.4 3.2 2.6 0.8 
Netherlands 28.1 11.3 8.8 3.1 1.4 1.7 1.7 
Average(1) 30.2 13.0 8.7 2.4 2.9 2.5 0.9 
Greece 26.3 13.4 7.0 1.3 2.0 1.5 1.2 
Spain 19.7 8.5 6.0 1.5 0.6 2.6 0.3 
Italy 26.4 16.3 6.8 1.7 1.1 0.5 0.1 
Portugal 24.3 11.2 7.0 2.8 1.6 1.3 0.4 
Average(1) 23.8 12.9 6.5 1.7 1.0 1.4 0.3 
Denmark 30.9 11.5 6.3 4.2 4.1 3.0 1.8 
Finland 26.9 10.0 6.8 3.6 3.1 2.7 0.9 
Sweden 33.5 13.4 8.8 4.8 3.2 2.0 1.1 
Average(1) 31.1 12.0 7.6 4.3 3.4 2.5 1.2 
Ireland 16.5 3.8 4.2 0.8 2.6 1.4 0.9 
UK 26.7 12.0 7.9 2.5 1.8 0.4 1.7 
Average(1) 25.9 11.3 7.6 2.4 1.9 0.5 1.6 
EU-15 28.3 12.9 8.0 2.2 2.3 1.9 1.0 
(1) Weighted averages  
Source: Eurostat. 
 
 
 
Box 1: The difficulties of international comparisons 
The differences in social protection systems make international comparisons difficult:  
- Incapacity benefits are very widespread in some countries where they play the role of unemployment or 
early retirement allowances. 
- Families can be supported through social benefits or tax allowances 
- Childcare can be facilitated though social benefits or collective services (nurseries, pre-primary 
schools). 
- In some countries (like in the UK) employees can chose to opt out public insurance if their employers 
provide a higher benefit 
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Table 1.3. Social protection expenditures in 1992 
As a percentage of GDP 
 Total Old-age Health Incapacity Family Unempl. Exclusion 
Austria 27.0 12.9 7,5 1.8 2.9 1,4 0.5 
Belgium 26.5 11.0 7.4 1.8 2.3 3.4 0.6 
France 27.8 12.0 7.9 1.7 2.7 2.5 1.1 
Germany 26.6 11.0 8.5 1.7 2.2 2.6 0.7 
Netherlands 30.3 11.3 8.9 4.9 1.5 2.6 1.1 
Average(1) 27.4 11.5 8.2 2.1 2.3 2.6 0.9 
Greece 20.3 10.8 5.3 1.2 1.7 0.9 0.7 
Spain 21.8 8.9 6.4 1.6 0.4 4.3 0.2 
Italy 25.1 15.1 6.6 1.7 0.8 0.7 0.0 
Portugal 16.5 6.7 5.6 2.4 1.0 0.7 0.1 
Average(1) 23.0 12.0 6.4 1.7 0.7 2.0 0.1 
Denmark 29.5 10.4 5.8 2.9 3.5 4.9 2.0 
Finland 32.6 10.5 7.6 4.9 4.2 4.3 1.1 
Sweden 37.7 13.8 8.6 4.0 4.5 4.3 2.4 
Average(1) 34.3 12.0 7.3 3.9 4.1 4.5 1.9 
Ireland 19.4 5.5 6.6 0.9 2.2 3.2 1.0 
UK 26.7 11.5 6.6 2.5 2.3 1.9 1.8 
Average(1) 26.1 11.0 6.6 2.4 2.3 2.0 1.7 
EU-15 26.6 11.8 7.5 2.1 2.0 2.4 0.9 
(1) Weighted averages  
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Models also differ in terms of degree of market regulation. From 1998 to 2003, product 
markets’ regulation decreased in all countries, so that the ranking of countries in terms of 
regulation remained unchanged from liberal, Scandinavian, continental to Mediterranean 
countries (Table 1.4). The same ranking can be found in terms of labour regulation, with a 
less clear convergence.  
Unemployment allowances are more generous in continental and Scandinavian countries than 
in liberal countries and less generous in Mediterranean countries.  
Social models differ also in terms of tax structure (see Table 1.5). Direct taxation is low in 
liberal countries, high in continental countries, slightly less high in Mediterranean countries, 
where indirect taxation is more substantial; households’ taxation is higher in Scandinavian 
countries, while company taxation is relatively low.  
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Table 1.4. Product and labour market regulation 
 Product market regulation Employment protection legislation 
Unemployment 
net replacement rate
 1998 2003 1990 1998 2003 2004 
Austria 1.8 1.3 2.2 2.4 2.2 73 
Belgium 1.9 1.4 3.2 2.5 2.5 66 
France 2.4 1.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 71 
Germany 1.8 1.3 3.2 2.6 2.5 75 
Netherlands 1.8 1.4 2.7 2.3 2.3 79 
Average(1) 2.0 1.4 2.9 2.6 2.6 73 
Italy 2.7 1.8 3.6 3.1 2.4 6 
Greece 2.7 1.7 3.6 3.5 2.9 33 
Portugal 2.2 1.7 4.1 3.7 3.5 72 
Spain 2.1 1.5 3.8 3.0 3.1 52 
Average(1) 2.4 1.7 3.7 3.1 2.8 29 
Denmark 1.4 1.1 2.3 1.8 1.8 77 
Finland 2.1 1.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 75 
Sweden 1.8 1.1 3.5 2.6 2.6 77 
Average(1) 1.8 1.2 2.9 2.3 2.2 76 
Ireland 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.3 71 
UK 1.1 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.1 66 
Average(1) 1.1 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.1 66 
US 1.3 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.7 29 
(1) Weighted averages. 
Source: OECD. 
 
Table 1.5. Maximal tax rates in 2006 
 Income tax  Corporate tax 
Austria 50 25 
Belgium 50 35.5 
France 48.1 34.4 
Germany 44.3 39,3 
Netherlands 52 31.5 
Average(1) 47.0 36.3 
Italy 43 37.25 
Greece 40 32 
Portugal 42 22.5 
Spain 45 35 
Average(1) 43.4 35.1 
Denmark 59.8 28 
Finland 56.75 26 
Sweden 56.5 28 
Average(1) 57.3 27.5 
Ireland 42 12.5 
UK 40 30 
Average(1) 40.2 28.6 
(1) Weighted averages. 
 Source: European Commission. 
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Table 1.6 shows another typology, where social protection systems are broken down into: 
social insurance systems (benefits depend on contributions paid although there is also some 
redistribution), universal systems (entitlement to all citizens) and assistance systems 
(targeting the poor, income-tested). Besides public systems are complemented with more or 
less compulsory occupational systems, benefiting from tax incentives and relying more or less 
on public decisions and on private individual insurance systems (that benefit often from tax 
incentives). Each country is characterised by specific choices on each insured risk.  
Table 1.6. Social benefits: A typology 
 Assistance Universal 
system 
Social 
insurance 
Occupational 
insurances 
Private 
insurance 
Pensions,  
long-term care, 
incapacity 
Minimum pension Flat pension 
Incapacity 
benefits 
Pays-as-you-go 
systems Company funds 
Individual 
insurance 
Family, 
Housing 
Housing benefits, 
Minimum income 
Universal 
benefits 
Family tax credit 
or allowance  
 
Health Free health care 
for the poor 
Universal public 
system 
Health insurance Mutual 
insurance 
funds 
Private 
insurance 
Unemployment, 
Exclusion 
Minimum income  Unemployment 
benefit 
  
By nature, the liberal model favours assistance systems complemented by private insurance 
systems. This raises the question of the level of assistance benefits and does not ensure social 
cohesion. The lower middle-class may turn out to be the looser, because it is not covered by 
social protection and pays relatively high tax and premiums. The continental model favours 
social insurance systems for pensions and unemployment, but these systems are 
complemented with assistance systems and universal systems (family, sickness, poverty).  
The Scandinavian model is based on universal systems complemented in practice by more or 
less universal occupational systems (for pensions). Disincentives to work are corrected by 
social control and activation policies in Scandinavian countries. The two models require the 
acceptance of a high level of taxation (which is easier in a homogeneous society, like in 
Scandinavian countries). The disparities between models make difficult to define ‘the’ ESM. 
On the other hand, it must have a specific content, if its evocation is not a fallacy. The debate 
on the content of MSE should be open, even if it is political and conflictual. 
2. Economic and social performance of social models in Europe  
2.1. Economic performances 
European economic performance has deteriorated since the beginning of the nineties, 
compared with the past as well with the United States. Growth has been disappointingly low 
compared with the expectations raised by the European integration and the enlargement 
project. Many economists blame the high level of taxes and government expenditures, the 
degree of regulation, and the costs of welfare in Europe as main reasons for Europe’s 
economic underperformance. Some emphasise the inadequacy of macroeconomic policies. 
Other authors emphasise the low level of investments in future (education, research, 
innovation).  
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Table 2.1. Economic performance 
Real GDP growth (percent p.a.) 1970/2006 1970/1990 1990/2006 
    
Continental Model  2.3 2.7 1.9 
Germany  2.2 2.6 1.7 
France  2.4 3.0 1.8 
Belgium  2.4 2.7 2.0 
The Netherlands  2.5 2.5 2.5 
Austria  2.6 3.0 2.3 
Mediterranean Model  2.6 3.1 2.0 
Greece  2.8 2.3 3.1 
Italy  2.3 3.1 1.3 
Portugal  3.1 4.0 2.1 
Spain  3.2 3.2 3.0 
Scandinavian Model  2.3 2.5 2.3 
Denmark  2.0 2.2 2.2 
Finland  2.9 3.5 2.4 
Sweden  2.1 2.1 2.2 
Liberal Model 2.5 2.3 2.8 
Ireland  5.2 4.1 6.7 
United Kingdom  2.3 2.2 2.5 
EU-15  2.4 2.8 2.0 
United States  3.1 3.2 3.0 
 
In the long run (1970-2006) there are rather small differences between social models in 
Europe: the best performers were countries with initial low level of GDP par capita (Greece, 
Portugal; Spain) rather than countries which belong to a particular model. During the 1970-
1990 period, Continental model countries obtained the best results; Scandinavian and UK the 
worst. The situation had changed since 1990 (see Table 2.1): GDP per capita and real GDP 
growth was high in liberal and Scandinavian countries and rather low in Continental and 
Mediterranean countries. Is it an effect of the inadequacy of these models with globalization 
or a temporary failure?  
It is not surprising that the catching-up process results in higher long-run growth for countries 
with a low initial level of GDP per head (e.g., Southern Europe, Ireland). Therefore we ran a 
regression of GDP growth on GDP level per head and calculated the per capita growth rate 
which could be expected for each country given its initial level of GDP per head in PPS (i.e., 
the convergence process). The difference between the actual and the ‘hypothetical’ growth 
rate per capita gives us an indicator of relative economic performance. According to this 
indicator, economic performance since 1970 has been the highest in Ireland and Finland; 
relatively weak in France, Greece and Denmark. Since 1990, the liberal and the Scandinavian 
countries outperform continental countries (but Austria has good outcome, France and 
Germany particularly bad), the Mediterranean countries have contrasting performances (bad 
for Italy and Portugal; good for Greece and Spain). 
A cross-country diagram (see Figure 2.1) shows that countries with healthy social standards 
had a better economic performance. Although the Scandinavian countries display the highest 
level of state intervention, i.e. high taxes and large public social expenditures, these countries 
have performed very well in the last decade.  
Employment rates (see Table 2.3) are closely related to economic performances. They are the 
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highest in Scandinavia, followed by the Anglo-Saxon countries. Public services (child care 
etc.) largely explain the high employment rate in Scandinavia, they allow women to work 
and, in the same time, they create jobs. Marketisation of household services (low-
wage service jobs) explains the high employment rate in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The 
classification in term of unemployment rate is practically the reverse, even if there are some 
anomalies, due to female activity: Sweden and France seem to have too many unemployed 
people; Italy and Ireland too few. In full-time equivalent employment rate, there is a gap of 
about 12.5% (16%) between Continental (Mediterranean) countries and Scandinavian ones.  
Table 2.2. Economic performance 
 Real GDP growth per capita (Percent p.a.) 
Actual minus hypothetical real 
GDP growth per capita 
(Percent. points p.a.) 
 1970/2006 1990/2006 1970/20061 1990/20062 
     
Continental Model  1.8 1.4 -0.1 –0.2 
Germany  1.8 1.3 0.0 -0.2 
France  1.8 1.3 -0.2 -0.4 
Belgium  2.1 1.6 0.1 –0.1 
The Netherlands  1.8 1.8 -0.1 0.1 
Austria  2.3 1.8 0.2 0.2 
Mediterranean Model  2.3 1.6 0.0 -0.3 
Greece  2.2 2.5 -0.2 0.3 
Italy  2.2 1.1 0.1 -0.6 
Portugal  2.6 1.7 0.0 -0.5 
Spain  2.4 2.2 0.0 0.2 
Scandinavian Model  1.9 1.9 0.0 0.2 
Denmark  1.7 1.9 -0.2 0.2 
Finland  2.5 2.2 0.3 0.5 
Sweden  1.8 1.8 0.0 0.2 
Liberal Model 2.2 2.3 0.1 0.4 
Ireland  4.1 5.1 1.6 3.0 
United Kingdom  2.1 2.1 0.0 0.3 
EU 15  2.0 1.6 -0.1 -0.2 
United States  2.0 1.8 0.4 0.4 
*Hypothetical growth is the rate which could be expected for each country given its initial level of GDP per 
capita, based on the following regression equations for 13 EU countries: 
(1)   ΔY = 3.3103 – 0.5256*Yti 
R2 = 0.66  (13.3) (5.0) 
1970/2006 
(2)  ΔY = 2.9994 – 0.0799*Yti 
R2 = 0.22  (5.1) (2.1) 
1990/2006 
Y  GDP per capita in 1,000 PPS, ΔY  growth of real GDP per capita p.a. 
EU15 countries except Ireland and Luxembourg 
Source: Eurostat, OECD, WIFO calculations. 
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Figure 2.1. Public social expenditure and economic performance 
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Table 2.3. Economic indicators 
 GDP per capita Employment rate 2005 Unemployment rate 
 1991 2006  Full-time equivalent 2006 
      
Continental Model  108.0 103.6 65.3 60.2 8.1 
Germany  109.7 102.1 65.4 60.4 8.4 
France  104.9 99.1 63.1 59.7 9.4 
Belgium  109.5 109.5 61.1 57.1 8.2 
Netherlands  107.1 116.4 73.2  60.9 3.9 
Austria  114.6 114.0 68.6  63.7 4.8 
Mediterranean Model  90.9 88.9 60.4  58.4  7.7 
Greece  67.5 78.9 60.1  59.2 8.9 
Italy  106.0 92.2 57.6  55.5 6.8 
Portugal  69.1 65.3 67.5  65.6 7.7 
Spain  79.4 90.5 63.3  60.9 8.6 
Scandinavian Model  105.8 108.8 72.4 67.7 6.3 
Denmark  107.4 113.8 75.9  69.4 3.9 
Finland  98.3 105.4 68.4  65.3 7.7 
Sweden  108.9 107.6 72.5  68.0  7.0 
Liberal Model 92.9 109.4 71.4  65.3 5.2 
Ireland  77.3 129.7 67.6  64.6 4.4 
United Kingdom  94.3  107.6 71.7  65.4 5.3 
United States  132.1 136.8 71.5  67.0 5,0 
Source: Eurostat, OECD. 
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Male employment rates are relatively low in Scandinavian and liberal countries because of the 
size of incapacity benefits (see Table 2.4). By contrast, female employment rates are very 
high in Scandinavian countries, while it is the opposite for Mediterranean countries, the UK 
and continental countries being in an intermediate position. Lastly older workers’ 
employment rates are high in Scandinavian countries, low in continental countries and very 
low in Mediterranean countries (and also in Belgium and Austria). Mediterranean countries 
are thus characterised by a specific social choice where employment is focused on adult 
males. This choice is not sustainable with low fertility rates and demographic prospects in 
these countries. Moving towards the Scandinavian model becomes a necessity. Older 
workers’ low employment rates may also be viewed as a social choice (like in Austria), which 
should be respected or as the pernicious effect of persistence of wrong economic choices 
made in times of high unemployment rates.  
Table 2.4. Activity indicators (2005) 
 Activity rate Part-time rate 
 Male 25-54 Female 25-54 55-64  
     
Continental Model  93.3 79.4 46.6 19.9 
Germany  93.6 79.1 52.1 21.8 
France  93.8 80.7 43.6 13.6 
Belgium  91.8 76.8 33.5 18.1 
Netherlands  91.4 77.8 47.0 35.7 
Austria  92.8 79.9 33.0 16.2 
Mediterranean Model  92.8 67.5 39.6 12.5 
Greece  94.7 68.1 43.1 6.1 
Italy  91.7 64.6 32.6 14.7 
Portugal  92.5 81.8 53.8 9.8 
Spain  92.4 69.0 45.9 11.4 
Scandinavian Model  91.5 85.5 65.8 14.2 
Denmark  91.1 84.1 62.9 18.0 
Finland  90.3 85.2 56.4 11.2 
Sweden  92.4 86.5 72.8 13.5 
Liberal Model 91.0 76.9 58.0 23.2 
Ireland  92.2 69.6 53.2 18.6 
UK 90.9 77.5 58.4 23.6 
United States  90.5 75.3 62.9 12.8 
Source:  OECD. 
 
Activity rates have risen noticeably in Continental and Mediterranean countries in the last 
decade (Table 2.5), although the potential labour force has already started to decline in some 
countries (Germany, Greece, Italy). Unemployment rates have therefore hardly declined. 
Labour productivity growth has been slow in continental Europe as compared to Scandinavian 
or liberal countries, but it is difficult to disentangle the effect of slow technological progress 
from the effect of economic policy measures introduced to increase the number of unskilled 
jobs.  
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Table 2.5. Economic performance 1996-2006, in % per year 
 15-64 Population 
Activity rate Unemploy-
ment rate Employment Productivity GDP Growth
       
Continental Model        
Germany  -0.3 0.7 0.0 +0.4 +1.1 +1.5 
France  0.5 0.3 -0.2 +1.0 +1.2 +2.2 
Belgium  0.3 0.5 -0.1 +0.9 +1.3 +2.2 
Netherlands  0.6 0.7 -0.2 +1.5 +0.9 +2.4 
Austria  0.7 0.0 0.0  +0.7 +1.6 +2.3 
Mediterranean Model       
Greece  -0.1 0.9 -0.1 +0.9 +3.2 +4.1 
Italy  -0.1 0.9 -0.4 +1.2 +0.2 +1.4 
Portugal  0.3 0.7 0.0  +1.0 +1.1 +2.1 
Spain  0.6 1.9 -0.9  +3.4 +0.4 +3.8 
Scandinavian Model       
Denmark  0.2 0.2 -0.2 +0.6 +1.5 +2.1 
Finland  0.5 0.4 -0.7  +1.6 +2.1 +3.7 
Sweden  0.4 0.1 -0.3 +0.8 +2.2 +3.0 
Liberal Model       
Ireland  2.5 1.2 -0.7 +4.4 +2.6 +7.1 
United Kingdom 0.8 0.1 -0.2 +1.1 +1.7 +2.8 
       
United States  1.4 -0.1 -0.1 +1.4 +1.8 +3.2 
Source: European Commission, OFCE calculations. 
 
The contemporary growth theory insists on the crucial role played by human capital 
accumulation and by the diffusion of knowledge on the medium-term growth rate of advanced 
economies. Accordingly, it can be argued that the capability to support the growth of human 
capital and of productivity is an acid test for the welfare state.  Investments into the future 
may be an important reason for diverging economic developments. High investment in R&D, 
ICT, education and infrastructure are crucial for long-run economic development. R&D 
expenditure has been particularly high and strongly increasing in Scandinavia, but it has been 
surprisingly low in Ireland. In Germany, R&D ratios have been relatively high, but slightly 
decreasing. Most countries of Southern Europe have been lagging behind with respect to their 
use of information technologies (Table 2.6). Recent research has highlighted the vital role 
played by the first years of life for future cognitive development. Spending on the youngest 
groups of population can be scrutinised on its own account. The share of GDP that goes to 
child care and pre-primary education is considerably higher in Scandinavian countries and in 
France than in the other European countries (Table 2.6).  
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Table 2.6. Growth drivers: Investment in the future 
 Expenditure on R&D IT expenditure 
Youth education 
attainment level1) 
Public 
expenditure for 
pre-primary care 
 2005 2005 2005 2005 
 percent of GDP percent Percent of GDP 
Continental Model  2.3  3.3 77.3 0.7 
Germany  2.5  3.1 71.5 0.4 
France  2.1  3.4 82.6 1.2 
Belgium  1.8  2.9 81.8 0.8 
Netherlands  1.8  3.9 75.6 0.5 
Austria  2.4  3.0 85.9 0.6 
Mediterranean Model  1.0  1.8 69.1 0.5 
Greece  0.6  1.2 84.1 0.4 
Italy  1.1  1.9 73.6 0.6 
Portugal  0.8  2.2 49.0 0.8 
Spain  1.1  1.7 61.8 0.5 
Scandinavian Model  3.4 3.9 83.5 1.3 
Denmark  2.4  3.4 77.1 1.6 
Finland  3.5  3.7 83.4 1.4 
Sweden  3.9  4.4 87.5 1.3 
Liberal Europe  1.7  4.0 78.8 0.6 
Ireland  1.3  2.0 85.8 0.2 
United Kingdom 1.7  4.2 78.2 0.6 
EU 15  1.9 3.1 74.6 0.7 
United States  2.7 4.0 – 0.7 
Source: Eurostat. OECD, Family and Education Database 1) Percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having 
completed at least upper secondary education. 
 
Indicators on working conditions highlight the role played by human capital in the 
performance of European socio-economic models. Qualitative indicators support the view that 
Scandinavian countries come closest to achieving the aim of creating not only more, but also 
better jobs (Table 2.7). Whereas in Mediterranean countries only 67% workers share the 
opinion that they are learning new things at work, among countries belonging to the 
Scandinavian group almost 90% workers have a positive view of their learning curve on the 
job. Both Anglo-Saxon and Continental countries are between these two extreme positions, 
with the Netherlands as outliers that come close to the Scandinavian group. There is a strong 
correlation between the responses to this question and the findings with respect to the amount 
of training undergone by workers. Again, however, there are significant differences across 
countries, with the Scandinavian group at the top and Mediterranean countries at the bottom 
of the distribution. A similar, although less clear-cut pattern results from the answers to the 
question whether or not workers feel that they are able to apply their own ideas at work. 
Further evidence on job quality comes from cross-country differences in the share of workers 
who think they will be able to carry out the tasks associated with their current job at a later 
stage in life. On average, 70% of workers in Scandinavian countries believe that they are able 
to do the same job when they are aged 60. The equivalent proportion is lower in Anglo-Saxon 
and Continental countries. In Mediterranean countries, only 55% workers think that their 
current employment is suitable for older persons. These results correlate highly with 
satisfaction levels with working conditions. 
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Table 2.7. Qualitative indicators of employment situations 
 Job content and training 
 
Paid training in 
previous 12 
months 
Learning new 
things 
Able to apply 
own ideas in 
work 
Able to do the 
same job when 
60 
 Percent of total responses 
     
Continental Model  28.0 71.7 58.7 63.0 
Germany  25.3 66.1 49.8 73.6 
France  24.4 72.3 64.5 48.6 
Belgium  40.5 74.4 64.1 52.3 
The Netherlands  31.6 83.6 70.8 72.1 
Austria  37.5 76.8 60.2 59.9 
Mediterranean Model  17.1 66.8 58.1 55.0 
Greece  13.1 61.9 56.8 40.5 
Italy  16.9 71.9 58.4 59.9 
Portugal  15.1 69.1 62.1 45.7 
Spain  18.9 60.0 57.3 53.5 
Scandinavian Model  46.3 88.4 70.5 69.2 
Denmark  36.3 86.4 72.0 68.8 
Finland  52.6 90.0 64.3 65.2 
Sweden  51.0 89.3 73.1 69.7 
Liberal Model 38.5 69.2 59.7 62.7 
Ireland  37.3 76.9 68.1 53.2 
United Kingdom  38.6 68.6 59.0 63.5 
EU 15  27.4 70.5 59.2 60.8 
Source: Fourth European Working Conditions Survey (2005); WIFO calculations. 
 
2.2. Indicators of social performance 
The political target is not only high economic performance, but also high social and 
environmental performance (Lisbon strategy). We chose a number of indicators to explore 
this (Tables 2.8):  
1. Life satisfaction is the highest in Scandinavian countries (and in the Netherlands); it is the 
lowest in Mediterranean countries (and in France) 
2. An improvement in life situation was particularly felt in the Scandinavian countries, as 
well as Ireland and Spain. In the other Mediterranean countries and in Continental countries 
(except the Netherlands) people are more pessimistic. 
3. Income inequality: Scandinavian countries show the more equal income distribution. 
Mediterranean and liberal countries the more unequal2.  
4.Poverty rates are significantly higher in liberal and Mediterranean models, significantly 
weaker in Scandinavian countries. 
5.Life expectancy is lower in the Anglo-American countries than in other countries (except in 
Denmark). 
                                                 
2 It should be noted however that in the last decade, the performance of Scandinavian countries have 
deteriorated. The ratio between the income of 20% richest and the income of the 20% poorest increased from 3.0 
to 3.4. In liberal countries, it rose from 5.0 to 5.5. On the contrary, it declined from 4.5 to 4.0 in Continental 
countries and from 6 to 5.6 in Mediterranean countries.  
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Tables 2.8. Social indicators  
 Life satisfaction 
Income 
inequality 
D80/D20 
Poverty 
rate 
Life 
expectancy 
Infant rate 
mortality   
per 1.000 
 2007 2007- 1996 2005 2005  2004  2004  
Continental Model  72 2 4.0 13 79.1 4.1 
Germany  72 –6 4.1 13 78.9 4.1 
France  64 1 4.0 13 79.6 3.9 
Belgium  78 19 4.1 15 79.1 4.3 
Netherlands  94 33 4.0 11 78.5 4.1 
Austria  69 9 3.8 12 79.2 4.5 
Mediterranean Model  55 7 5.7 19 79.6 3.9 
Greece  34 –10 5.8 20 78.3 4.1 
Italy  49 –3 5.6 19 80.2 4.1 
Portugal  24 –16 8.2 20 77.5 4.0 
Spain  76 32 5.4 20 79.7 3.5 
Scandinavian Model  93 48 3.6 11 79.2 3.5 
Denmark  94 51 3.5 12 77.3 4.4 
Finland  88 36 3.6 12 78.7 3.3 
Sweden  94 52 3.3 9 80.3 3.1 
Liberal Model 78 25 5.6 19 78.5 5.1 
Ireland  82 58 5.0 20 77.9 4.9 
United Kingdom  78 23 5.6 19 78.5 5.1 
EU 15  70 10 4.7 16 79.2 4.1 
United States  - - - - 77.5 6.9 
 Fertility rate 
Hours 
worked by 
year 
Productivity 
by hours 
Prisoner rate 
per 100.000 
Trust in 
people 
 2005 2004 2005 2005  
Continental Model  1.59 1.443 98.3 97 0.31 
Germany  1.34 1.443 94.1 97 0.33 
France  1.94 1.441 101.5 88 0.21 
Belgium  1.64 1.522 110.7 90 0.29 
Netherlands  1.71 1.357 105.7 127 0.59 
Austria  1.40 1.550 85.1 108 0.31 
Mediterranean Model  1.33 1.695 75.0 115 0.30 
Greece  1.33 1.925 70.8 90 0.20 
Italy  1.31 1.585 77.4 97 0.32 
Portugal  1.40 1.694 50.3 123 0.10 
Spain  1.35 1.799 76.7 143 0.35 
Scandinavian Model  1.79 1.586 85.9 77 0.63 
Denmark  1.80 1.454 87.8 77 0.64 
Finland  1.80 1.736 81.5 75 0.57 
Sweden  1.77 1.585 87.3 78 0.64 
Liberal Model 1.79 1.667 86.7 139 0.29 
Ireland  1.86 1.642 104.1 85 0.35 
United Kingdom  1.78 1.669 85.2 143 0.29 
EU-15  1.58 1.565  109 0.32 
United States  2.09 1.824 100 738 0.36 
Source: EIRO; OECD; UNDP. 
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6.Infant mortality - an indicator of the efficiency of the health system – is substantially 
higher in liberal countries. Denmark seems to have a specific problem.  
7. The fertility rate is very low in the Mediterranean countries (as well as in Germany and 
Austria). It is higher in the Scandinavian countries and liberals (and in France). From this 
point of view, the continental model is not homogeneous. 
8. Hours worked: It appears that high GDP per capita in liberal countries is largely due to a 
high number of hours worked. Peoples work less in Continental Countries. 
9.On the contrary, Labour productivity per hour is relatively high in continental countries, 
relatively weak in Mediterranean ones. 
10 Prisoners: The share of prisoners is very high in the United States, and also relatively high 
in the United Kingdom. It is very low in Scandinavian countries.  
11. Trust in people is more common in Scandinavian countries (and in the Netherlands) than 
in other countries. This shows that the Scandinavian model is based on social practices that 
are deeply rooted in peoples’ minds and that it may be difficult to extend it to other countries 
where such practices are not a tradition (Algan and Cahuc, 2006) 
Globally, it appears a clear hierarchy of social performances: the Scandinavian countries are 
the betters; then, come the Continental countries; the Mediterranean and Liberals countries are 
less performing. 
2.3. Social model and competitiveness 
What factors may explain differences between these models in terms of growth and 
employment? Is the weight of social contributions on wages a factor? But such social 
contributions have a counterpart in terms of benefits and hence allow for lower wages. 
Moreover, as can be seen from Figure 2.2, high employment rates cannot be associated with 
low tax-to-GDP ratios. Similarly, there is no link between GDP growth and the weight of 
social protection in terms of GDP.  
The two extreme model types, namely the liberal Anglo-Saxon model and the Scandinavian 
universalistic model have shown the best economic performance. The first model type would 
be in line with the hypothesis of blaming the welfare state, the second contradicts this 
hypothesis. The worst performance is seen for the Continental model and the Mediterranean 
family-oriented model, which produced low growth and high unemployment. 
The liberal Anglo-American countries showed a slightly better performance during the last 
decade than the Scandinavian countries and a much better one than the continental European 
countries. However, regarding social indicators, these countries are lagging behind. 
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Figure 2.2. Employment rates and taxation rates (in 2003) 
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Source: OECD.  
Two models have reached a low unemployment. The liberal model is characterized by a low 
labour protection, low levels of taxation, low unemployment benefits and low expenses for 
labour market policy. Flexibility has prevented the emergence of mass unemployment, but not 
the increase in inequality.  
The Scandinavian countries and Austria having the highest taxes and the largest public social 
expenditure performed very well in economic terms during the last decades. Blaming the 
welfare state for low growth and weak competitiveness in the EU is not justified. The 
assumed trade-off between competitiveness and social justice (or efficiency and 
redistribution) is questionable. Economists insists on the financial burden of transfers and 
social services, but forget the individual and social costs of exclusion and social inequality, 
particularly in terms of public safety, health and labour productivity. Social cohesion, 
education, health and cooperative industrial relations are productive resources. Social 
protection can be an asset in providing education and training, facilitating labour mobility, 
and disconnecting the wage costs and living standards of unskilled labour. Solidarity or 
individual risk-taking is a matter of preferences, not of economics. The European countries 
have not condemned to converge towards the liberal model (See also Fitoussi, 2000). . 
The Social Democratic model is characterized by high tax rates and public expenditures. 
These countries are highly egalitarian and homogenous; the role of trade unions is important. 
The flight against unemployment passed through social cohesion, work sharing, and a high of 
consensus between the social partners; social negotiations centralised and co-ordinated. In 
addition, their small size and their degree of openness promote consensus among social 
partners on the need of a competitiveness strategy: high spending in education, R & D, market 
labour flexibility.  
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The Scandinavian countries were able to reform their institutions and incentives in a way to 
be competitive in the globalising economy (after years of under-performance). They have 
made their economies more flexible, while maintaining a strong security to workers by high 
benefit. . The resulting growth has enabled them to reduce deficits and debt. The same 
adaptability has not been achieved in the large countries of continental Europe.  But most 
importantly they implemented a strategy of excellence in innovation, education and 
technology diffusion. The same adaptability is not to be seen in the big continental European 
countries. 
Three elements of success may therefore be found from the experience of Scandinavian  
countries: the employment legislation and unemployment allowances rules which bring 
together a certain flexibility, significant benefits and retraining efforts ;  the role of social 
partners in face of shocks affecting an industry or the economy, a sector or a firm; the 
importance of economic innovation and education.  
Continental countries may have failed because of their inability to design a model able to 
adapt to globalisation, a model between the liberal model, source of inequalities, which their 
people do not wish, and a Scandinavian model that would not be easily implemented in large 
heterogeneous countries with no tradition of co-management between social partners and with 
high unemployment rates.  
The dominant class has not tried to protect the European social model, but took the 
opportunity of globalisation and single market to try to impose structural reforms in 
continental Europe, as reductions in public and social spending and labour market 
flexibilization (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2007). Without macroeconomic, social and economic 
consistent strategy, continental countries appear as the losers of globalization and European 
integration and globalization, when the Scandinavian countries and liberals do better.. 
To varying degrees and with specific manners, the successful countries give a great 
importance to individual activity, whether for liberal reasons (everyone must assures its 
needs) or Social Democrats ones (everyone must make a contribution to the society). On the 
contrary, the axis of the continental social model is that the society must provide a decent 
income for all those who can not assure their own needs. Workfare theses become popular 
more than welfare ones.  
At the EU level, the situation is not easy to manage. The continental model represents 50% of 
GDP in the EU-15, Mediterranean model 24%, but these two models are in crisis. The liberal 
model represents 20% and the Scandinavian model only 6%? At the EU level, the situation is 
not easy to address. Successful countries will not be willing to change their model and the 
convergence towards Scandinavian or Liberal models cannot be a choice made at the EU 
level. How then to encourage a change in the Continental or Mediterranean model?  
3. ESM, financial constraints and new challenges 
3.1 Six challenges for the Member States 
The European Social Model faces six challenges: financial sustainability, globalisation, the 
crisis of the continental model, too low fertility rates, social changes and reforms of the 
funding. 
1) How can the financial sustainability of the system be ensured? The pressures for higher 
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spending on health, old-age benefits, old-age care and fight against exclusion are almost 
unavoidable. They have structural causes:  
- Population ageing generates a rise in pensions, health and long-term care spending. 
- The rising trend in health spending is explained partly by population ageing and also 
by technological progress that allows for longer life expectancy but does not generally reduce 
the level of spending.  
- The decrease in fertility rates - and thus of the number of young people - reduces the 
need for family benefits, especially as the number of children per family decreases, and for 
education spending, but the young need more education to acquire higher skills and many 
countries (like Germany, Italy, Spain, etc) are considering policies to increase fertility and 
family incentives. 
- Rising female activity increases the number of families with two wage-earners and 
reduces the number of poor families, but implies that there is a need for substantial childcare 
financial support. Social evolution leads to a rise in the number of single parent families in 
need of support. 
- The improvement in the labour market situation may allow for lower unemployment 
and assistance allowances but may require costly measures in order to bring people back to 
work (in terms of training, social contributions cuts, etc…). 
How this rise in spending needs be addressed? Four global strategies may be considered.  
- The first strategy consists of cutting progressively the level of benefits, for instance by 
indexing them to prices only or by reducing reimbursement rates for medical expenses. The 
drawback of this strategy is that it will lead to an uncontrolled reduction of the size of the 
welfare state. For instance, would it be fair that the relative situation of families or the poor is 
worsened? The reliability of the welfare state would be damaged without any alternative 
solution being socially and politically decided.  
- A second strategy consists in maintaining the Welfare state, with a stabilisation of 
replacement rates, social minima and family benefit to wage ratios, etc. In the health area, the 
government, medical workers and patients would have to implement a social supervision of 
reimbursed spending, based on medical evaluation. As concerns pensions, the retirement age 
would have to increase so that the ratio of number of years in retirement/number of years at 
work remains stable. Such a strategy would maintain social cohesion in Europe. It may imply 
some rise in contributions paid by active people (for pensions and unemployment) and by all 
households (for health and assistance), but companies’ competitiveness would not be affected 
and tax harmonisation in Europe should allow countries to tax their residents.  
- The third strategy consists in breaking down social protection into two sectors: one 
sector would remain public (assistance, family and unemployment benefits) at its current 
level. A second sector (pensions, health) would be transferred to individual or occupational 
private insurances, which would allow tax-to-GDP ratios to decrease. But private health 
insurances may select risks and deny reimbursement of some expenses. Private health 
insurances would thus need to be closely supervised, be mandatory and requested to 
reimburse a certain basket of health care. There is no certainty that private insurance is less 
costly than public insurance. In the long term, private pension funds will be less costly than 
public funds if the rate of return of invested funds is clearly above the GDP growth rate 
augmented by the rate of increase of the number of years in retirement. But the transitory 
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phase would be costly for generations who would have to pay for older generations while 
simultaneously accumulating assets to provide their own pensions. There would be a gain 
only in the long run. 
- The fourth strategy would consist of targeting social protection towards the poorer 
(like in the Anglo-Saxon model) and letting the market play for the rest of the population. 
However a two-speed framework raises issues: the wealthiest and the  employees of large 
companies would benefit from a good insurance, while employees in small companies, 
employees with short-term work contracts and the socially excluded would have to rely on 
national solidarity. The middle class would lose in that system, because they would have to 
pay both for themselves and the poor while the sustainability of the system would be 
uncertain: ‘benefits for the poor are poor benefits’. There is a risk that the system deteriorates 
in losing the support of a substantial part of the population.   
A solution seems to have reached a consensus view today and allows, effectively or fictively 
to avoid choosing between the four strategies, by raising substantially employment (for older 
workers and females in Southern economies). This solution would provide a double dividend 
in terms of old-age, unemployment and exclusion benefits and would give rooms for 
manoeuvre in terms of health and long-term care. This strategy however raises several issues: 
it often focuses on bringing unskilled workers back to work in a situation where supply for 
unskilled labour exceeds demand, at the risk of increasing unemployment and reducing wages 
of that group of workers. Rising demand for unskilled labour has a cost in terms of lower 
social contributions. Can this strategy be implemented through work incentives? This would 
mean increasing the gap between assistance and work incomes, which is often obtained by 
cutting assistance benefits thus in increasing the poverty risk for those who cannot find a job. 
For instance, it is often suggested that the retirement age should be made neutral from an 
actuarial point of view to give older workers an incentive to work until 65. Instead of getting a 
pension of 750 euro if they retire at 60, workers would be offered the possibility to get 900 
euro if they decide to retire at 65 or 600 if they retire at 60. This would increase the income 
gap between workers, depending of whether they can or cannot work until they are 65 (e.g. 
between managers and manual workers). The same issue arises for the disabled and women 
with children. Should social benefits be reduced for economically inactive single mothers 
with young children or for families with one worker, although they are already the poorer 
households? Thus, in general, work incentives should increase workers’ incomes, for instance 
in increasing the offer of free childcare, rather than in reducing the incomes of those without a 
job, but this would strongly reduce the financial returns of the measure.  
2) Could ESM survive in a global world? The answer could be positive only if social 
protection is not a handicap but also a factor of higher productivity and competitiveness. 
Social cohesion arising from the reduction of incomes inequalities, from public education and 
health should raise productivity, through avoiding that a large part of the population is left 
apart and becomes a financial weight for society. Job stability must be an incentive for 
companies to invest in workers and for workers to invest in their company. However, social 
protection, implemented in a national framework, is challenged by globalization and 
European construction. Globalisation tends to dismantle national societies, which reduce 
solidarities, both national than between salaries. Incomes inequalities rise: the wealthiest do 
not want anymore to pay for the poor, high skilled salaries for the unemployed; companies do 
not wish to locate their production in countries where social protection is too generous. Due to  
globalization, the rich, the managers and the companies can more easily avoid the burden of 
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social protection. Lastly the Internal Market places EU countries in direct competition and 
increases the risk of a race-to-the-bottom in social and taxation areas. In the absence of tax 
coordination in Europe, the possibilities of national redistribution could be reduced. For 
instance all countries have been obliged to abolish personal wealth taxation. Should Europe 
protect the EMS or be a Trojan horse for its dismantlement? But, how to manage a 
heterogeneous Europe where the trade-off between economic growth and social cohesion 
varies across countries because of both their economic situation and their history? In the 
future, Europe may have to choose between the liberal model, the preservation of national 
models through tax and social coordination or the progressive introduction of a European 
model.  
3) The continental ESM is facing strong criticism, accused of being too costly, too protective, 
damaging work incentives and preventing flexibility and innovation. Must continental model 
resign itself to its erosion by the gradual but continuous degradation of benefits relative to 
wages? The liberal model (full employment through economic constraints and flexibility) 
raises fears while the Scandinavian model (full employment with solidarity) seems difficult to 
extend to large, open and heterogeneous economies where unemployment is high. Abolishing 
employment protection could reduce one of the main advantages of the ESM: the investment 
in workers in their companies, the interest for companies to train their employees. Should we 
abandon the objective of income equality and the fight against poverty in order to increase the 
work incentives? There is a great risk to accentuate the social division and to recreate a class 
of poor peoples with no hope of seeing their children out of poverty.  
4) Should the decrease in fertility rates be accepted and possibly lead to increased 
immigration or should measures be taken to stop the decrease through helping childcare for 
mothers who stay at home and/or work? Should child poverty be reduced, through financial 
support for mothers who do not have a job (the poorer) or through work financial incentives 
(work being the best insurance against precariousness). Should family policies focus on the 
poorer (in order to prevent child poverty) or should they benefit all families (to support 
fertility)? Should benefits be in kind or cash? The experience of Scandinavian countries and 
of France shows that it is possible to raise female employment rates and fertility rates through 
a generous family policy and socially organised and financed childcare.  
5) Social protection systems need to adapt to sociological changes (gender equality, couples 
instability). But should the measures in favour of women (like reversion pensions) be 
abolished, although women still have lower wage earnings and employment rates than men? 
Should social benefits and taxation become individual, which could be a work incentive for 
women but would make redistribution less accurate? With the actual fertility situation in 
Europe, it is not envisage undertaking a reform of taxation and benefits which would be 
detrimental to families with children.  
6) How to finance social protection? Initially in Bismarkian countries, social protection was 
linked to wage-earning and thus financed by employers’ and employees’ contributions. Social 
protection has now become universal as concerns health and family. Health and family 
benefits should therefore be financed by general taxation, while unemployment and old-age 
allowances should be financed by contributions, insofar as these allowances are linked to 
contributions. There are thus economic justifications for reducing the share of social benefits 
financed by wages, especially for lower wages. It is not justified that contributions levied on 
activity incomes finance family or health benefits, as in most continental and liberal countries 
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(see Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1. How main risks are financed in the EU-15 
 Health (in kind) Old-age Unemployment Family Work injury 
Belgium SC+AI SC+AI SC+AI SC+AI Ass. 
Denmark AI AI + SC 
(supplementary)
SC AI SC 
Germany SC SC + Gov SC AI SC 
Greece SC + Gov SC + Gov SC SC SC 
Spain AI SC SC AI SC 
France SC + AI SC + AI SC SC + AI SC 
Ireland AI SC SC + Gov AI SC 
Italy SC +AI SC +Gov SC SC SC 
Neths SC +AI SC +AI SC Gov — 
Austria SC SC SC SC+Gov SC 
Portugal Gov SC SC SC +Gov Ass. 
Finland AI SC + AI +Gov SC +Gov Gov SC 
Sweden Gov SC + Gov SC + Gov Gov SC 
UK SC + Gov SC SC + Gov Gov Gov 
Notes: SC means funding through social contributions, AI: funding through affected tax, Gov: funding through 
the general budget or permanent government grant. 
Source: MISSOC, European Commission. 
 
This being said, more resources remain to be found to compensate for the reduction of 
contributions based on wages.3 Four suggestions can be made.  
1. A part of the burden may be transferred from workers to old-age pensioners or people 
with financial incomes through personal income taxation (like with the French CSG). 
However, pensions are expected to be cut in most EU countries and it would be 
difficult to add a tax increase. It would be more interesting to investigate an increase 
in financial incomes taxation, but the amount of potential new resources is limited. 
2. VAT is deductible from investment and thus weighs only on labour. Transferring 
social contribution to VAT would therefore have no favourable impact on the 
capital/labour relative cost. In the short run, the main effect is a gain in price 
competitiveness since VAT weighs on imports and can be deducted from exports. It is 
a sort of hidden devaluation, allowing for competitiveness gains paid by rising 
inflation. The risk is that, following the example of Germany in 2007, EU countries 
introduce the same king of non-cooperative strategies, without any net advantages. 
3. A contribution on added value (like the Italian IRAP) would be a tax levied on 
companies’ value added, without export and investment deductibility and impacting 
on imports. The transfer of employers’ contributions to a contribution on value added 
would raise the cost of capital and decrease labour costs which could have a positive 
effect on employment in countries with mass unemployment. But it is a delicate 
                                                 
3 This point has been widely debated in France in 2006 (see Bernard et al., 2006). 
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strategy which would be positive for labour intensive sectors but detrimental to capital 
intensive sectors.  
4. Environmental taxation could provide a double dividend, in supporting employment 
and fighting against the deteriorations of the environment. The double dividend will 
be obtained only in countries in unemployment situation. The reform supposes costly 
adjustments by firms. It would strongly affect some sectors that could be tempted to 
relocate in countries with lower environmental taxation. It thus requires coordination 
at least at the EU-level. 
Table 3.2. Taxes, as a percentage of GDP in 2005 
 Labour Capital Environment Consumption 
Belgium 23.8 10.4 2.4 11.3 
Denmark 24.8 9.6 5.8 16.1 
Germany 22.3 6.4 2.5 10.1 
Ireland 10.5 8.8 2.3 11.4 
Greece 14.1 8.4 2.3 12.0 
Spain 16.1 10.2 2.0 9.8 
France 23.3 9.4 2.4 11.4 
Italy 20.4 10.1 2.8 10.1 
Netherlands 17.7 8.3 4.0 12.1 
Austria 23.3 6.7 2.6 12.1 
Portugal 14.7 6.6 3.1 12.8 
Finland 23.3 6.9 3.0 13.7 
Sweden 31.1 7.0 2.9 13.1 
UK 14.4 11.1 2.5 11.4 
Source: Eurostat. 
3.2. Pension reforms 
Many national reforms of pension systems have already been introduced in the EU in order to 
address the issue of ageing populations. In general, the strategy of raising social contributions 
has not been chosen. The strategies implemented include cuts in pension benefits, (often 
through abolishing the indexation to wages), postponement of retirement age or increase in 
the number of years of working life requested to be entitled to a full pension, and sometimes 
the introduction of a notional fund which guarantees that pension systems are automatically in 
balance. Pension reforms have often been complemented by the introduction of a pension 
fund, mandatory or favoured by tax incentives.  
Cuts in pension benefits and notional funds generate considerable uncertainty on the future 
level of pensions. According to the projections collected by the Commission (see table 3.3), 
pensions cuts will be especially large in Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Portugal and 
Sweden. Is this socially acceptable? There is a strong risk that old-age pensioners will be 
tomorrow among the poorer as this was the case in the past. Only France and Sweden 
recognise this cut in pensions (see Table 3.4). Some countries announce they will compensate 
for lower pensions through the development of pension funds (Germany, Denmark, Italy). In 
other countries, the announcements show some inconsistency (Austria). 
Most countries announce that their pension systems will be in balance owing to a strong rise 
in female employment (Spain, Belgium, Italy) or older workers (55-64) employment (Austria, 
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Spain France, Italy), but these countries have not launched reforms that would promote for 
such rises in employment: reforming family policy and childcare and organising mobilisation 
of social partners. 
Table 3.3. Change in public pensions as a percentage of GDP, 
according to the Commission 
 Pension benefits,  % of GDP** 
Explicative factors, 
of which:  
 2005 2050 Trend  2050 
Employment 
rate impact 
Number of 
pensioners 
impact 
Replacement 
ratio effect 
Germany 11.1 13.0 18.6 -1.2 -0.6 -3.8 
Austria 13.2 12.2 24.5 -1.4 -6.2 -4.6 
Belgium 10.4 15.5 18.1 -1.6 -0.4 -0.6 
Denmark 9.6 12.8 16.8 -0.4 -3.0 -0.6 
Spain 8.7 15.7 21.1 -2.0 -2.5 -0.8 
Finland 10.3 13.7 19.2 -1.0 -3.5 -1.0 
France 12.8 14.8 21.5 -1.0 -2.0 -3.7 
Ireland 4.6 11.1 12.5 -0.6 -1.5 0.8 
Italy 14.3 14.7 25.8 -2.1 -3.5 -5.6 
Netherlands 7.4 11.2 13.7 -0.2 -1.8 -0.5 
Portugal 11.5 20.8 25.2 -0.2 -1.0 -3.2 
Sweden 10.4 11.3 15.2 -0.6 -0.2 -3.0 
UK 6.7 8.6 11.4    
EU-15 10.5 12.8 18.7 -1.0 -1.8 -3.1 
Source: European Commission. 
 
Table 3.4. Replacement rates at the average wage level 
 2004 2050 
 1st pillar 2nd pillar GRR/NRR 1st pillar 2nd pillar GRR/NRR 
Germany 43 0 43/63 34 15 48/67 
Austria 64  65/80 69  69/84 
Belgium 39 4 43/67 37 10 47/74 
Denmark 45 4 48/71 39 24 64/76 
Spain 90  90/97 85  85/92 
Finland 57  57/63 54  54/64 
France 66  66/80 49  49/63 
Greece 105  105/115 94  94/106 
Ireland 31 35 67/78 34 33 67/78 
Italy 79  79/88 64 16 80/92 
Netherlands 30 42 71/93 30 45 75/97 
Portugal 75  75/91 70  70/92 
Sweden 53 15 68/71 40 15 59/62 
UK 17 50 66/82 19 50 69/85 
Note : GRR: gross replacement ratio; NRR: net replacement ratio.  
Source : Social Protection Committee (2006)  
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Reforms also apply to early retirement schemes (where new entrants are not allowed) and 
incapacity schemes (that are tightened). There is a risk that income inequalities increase 
among pensioners and that some pensioners - especially manual workers - become poorer if 
older workers’ employment rates do not increase. Giving work incentives for older people 
may generate difficulties for the 55-64 year-old jobless and those working in declining 
sectors. It may also introduce strong inequalities between those who will be able to work 
longer and those who will have to retire earlier (manual workers, workers in declining 
sectors). Thus such a strategy requires specific schemes for given groups of workers (manual 
workers).  
Is it necessary to implement today policies to cut public spending in order to have rooms for 
manoeuvre to pay tomorrow’s pensions? This is the strategy implemented by Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Spain. Finland and Sweden have chosen accumulating in public 
pension funds. Pension funds have a strong role in the UK, the Netherlands and Ireland. But 
this is no more an option for other countries where demographic deterioration is already under 
way. Countries like Germany, France or Italy did not have a so strong private demand to 
undertake fiscal consolidation strategy.  
Table 3.5. Net public debt, as a percentage of GDP 
 Level, end 2006 2006-1995 
Germany 52 +20 
Austria 42 -4 
Belgium 77 -28 
Denmark 7 -29 
Spain 48 -21 
Finland -61 -57 
France 43 +5 
Greece 87 -4 
Italy 95 -3 
Netherlands  52 -18 
Portugal 47 +22 
Sweden -16 -41 
UK 42 +3 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
In the field of pensions, the Commission started to intervene in the framework of the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs). The objective was to avoid a rise in public pension 
expenditure, which could have increased government deficits and debt. Since July 2001, 
countries have been requested to provide projections on the long-term impact of demographic 
prospects in their Stability Programme. The Barcelona Council of March 2002 also invited 
MS to try and postpone the average effective retirement by 5 years by 2010. In 2002, the 
BEPGs requested the MS to ‘move towards a greater reliance to funding’ and to reduce public 
debt from now. The creation of the Social Protection Committee  (SPC) and the introduction 
of the Open Method of Coordination(OMC) may be seen as an answer by social affairs 
ministers and DG Employment and Social Affairs to the attempts of the economics and 
finance ministers and the DG-ECFIN to address social protection issues, especially pensions.  
However, even if the Commission warns on the risk that some countries may be tempted to 
finance pensions through government deficits, countries are well aware that their pension 
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systems should be in balance. With all countries being committed to ensure that their systems 
are financially balanced (through postponing the retirement age, cutting benefits or raising 
contributions), the future of pensions does not threaten public finance stability. It is not easy 
to understand why the future of pensions should be addressed each year in the stability 
programmes, especially as this framework for fiscal and cyclical developments is not 
appropriate to tackle long-term social issues. However, the joint report by the Commission 
and the Council on Adequate and Sustainable Pensions of December 2002 includes twice the 
note (note 13, page 43 and note 16, page 59) saying ‘Member States strategies to ensure 
sound and sustainable public finances are reported and assessed in the framework of the 
BEPG and the Stability and Growth Pact and should be in accordance with these.’ Pensions 
contributions having a direct counterpart in terms of pension benefits should not be included 
in tax revenues (although the report says explicitly the opposite, page 68). They do no reduce 
a priori work incentives. For a worker, they constitute an investment in profitability (rate of 
growth of wage bill plus rate of growth of years in retirement) that may be compared to 
financial assets profitability. There is no economic justification for disconnecting totally these 
two types of savings, one being negative: contributions, the other one being positive: pension 
savings. The level of social contributions must be considered independently of the objectives 
of lower tax to GDP ratios, the level of pensions must be disconnected from public spending 
cuts.  
The introduction of the OMC led to a first joint Report in December 2002. This report has 
three main objectives: ensuring financial sustainability of pension systems, ensuring the 
adequacy of pensions modernising pension systems. The report is less normative than BEPGs 
recommendations, reflecting the interventions of social affairs ministers. However the 
strategy is based on four pillars: using coming years to reduce public debt; promoting 
employment for the 55-64 year old; postponing the effective retirement age by 5 years; 
reducing the level of pensions paid by pay-as-you-go systems, making them more 
contributory and with higher actuarial neutrality through linking them more to years worked 
and age of retirement; developing pension funds.  
The option of increasing contributions is rejected without any discussion. But the Report 
insists also on the need to ensure that pensioners do not fall into poverty, by ensuring incomes 
floors and on the need to ensure adequate replacement ratios. The Report recognises the need 
to ensure decent pensions to workers who have seen their career interrupted, or have worked 
part-time (which is in contradiction with the third pillar). The report recognises several risks: 
indexing pensions to inflation induces a risk of rising pensioner poverty, having too low 
pensions would not be socially sustainable. The report recognises that pay-as-you-go pension 
system should remain the main axis of the system. Here also some contradictions remain. The 
Social Protection Committee has been able to include very relevant indicators in the list of 
pension adequacy indicators, like pensioner poverty rates and replacement ratios ensured by 
the pension system.   
Table 3.6. Two indicators of pension adequacy in 2004 
 PT PL HU AT DE FR NL SI SK IT CZ SE EL FI ES BE UK DK IE
A 109 109 101 95 92 90 88 87 85 84 83 80 79 75 75 73 72 70 65
B 63 59 61 67 45 66 43 42 55 58 51 58 49 46 56 42 .. .. 43
A) Relative income of 65+ in %; B) Replacement ratio in %. 
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In 2005, the BEPGs were transformed into a set of ‘24 integrated guidelines for employment 
and growth’. Three guidelines address the pension issue. Guideline 2 asks countries to tackle 
the issue of population ageing in reducing their public debt (but this ageing generates a rise in 
savings ratios, hence a higher demand for public bonds), to reform their pensions and health 
systems (i.e. to cut benefits) and last to increase employment rates. Guideline 17 reaffirms the 
objectives in terms of employment rates, especially the objective of 50% for workers aged 55-
64. Guideline 18 suggests increasing the labour supply of older workers through the 
modernisation of social protection systems, i.e. in abolishing early retirement schemes, in 
reducing pensions in case of early retirement, in giving financial incentives to postpone 
retirement age. This induces three risk: increasing poverty among older workers if companies 
do not want to hire them, cutting the total level of pensions, increasing inequalities between 
blue-collar workers (who will have no choice but to leave their job early) and managerial 
workers (who will have the opportunity to work longer and to save in pensions funds).  
In 2006, the joint report on social protection and social inclusion of 2006 highlights 5 issues: 
the definition of a minimum income for old people, the introduction of a close correlation 
between contributions and benefits, the lengthening of working life through more flexible 
retirement conditions, the development of private pensions, governance. The joint report of 
2007 observes that most countries anticipate substantial falls in replacement ratios that will 
need to be offset through a longer working life or the development of private systems.  
The golden age of retirement is finished in Europe. The risk is that financial constraints will 
progressively induce a strong decrease of pension/wage ratio in European countries, so that a 
higher proportion old people will be in poverty. The chosen strategy – the rise in older 
workers’ activity- is only part of the solution. In accordance with the logic of the ESM, 
countries should introduce pensioner minimum incomes above the at-risk-of-poverty line, and 
should ensure that replacement ratios are satisfactory (at least for low and middle wage 
earners), that specific measures apply to manual workers and that the postponement of 
effective retirement age accounts for the effective employment of older workers.  
3.3 Health systems 
Public health spending amounted to 6.4% of GDP in the EU-15 in 2005 – varying from 5.1% 
in Greece, 5.8% in Italy, 6% in Germany and 7.7% in France. According the Commission’s 
projections, they will rise to 8.1% in 2050, i.e. by 1.7 percentage point. Table 3.7 shows that 
there is no single relation between life expectancy and public spending. Life expectancy is 
high and health spending low in some countries (Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Malta) while spending 
is high for intermediate results in terms of life expectation in other countries (France, the 
Netherlands). Public health spending is low in the NMS but life expectancy is shorter in these 
countries than in the “old” members states.  
All countries face similar problems. What is the rise in expenditure requested to match 
populations’ needs and the rise which is attributable to a bad governance of the system 
resulting from information asymmetry and wasted money? How to curb down the rise in 
health spending without affecting the poorest: nationalising or privatising, two speed system, 
spending control, rise in the share of spending paid by the patients as a disincentive to 
consume medical goods and services. How to control suppliers?  
In the recent past, countries have tried to cut spending in several areas:  
- In many countries, general practitioners have a gate-keeper role; their income depends on 
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the number of patients they have and not on the number of consultations. Some countries have 
maintained a less costly public service. In both cases the risk is that the richer can get round  
the system in paying for practitioners outside the system, which  lead to a two-speed system.  
- Some countries are introduced a medical control of spending.   
- Other countries let competition play between health funds (see CPB (2007) on the Dutch 
case and Sowa (2007) on NMS). But this is an area where competition is a delicate issue 
(selection risk, problem of asymmetry of information). 
Table 3.7. Life expectancy and health spending 
 Life expectancy 
in 2004-Men 
Life expectancy 
in 2004-Women 
Health expenditure 
per head, PPS 
Sweden 78.1 82.4 2171 
Italy 77.3 83.2 1548 
Spain 76.6 83.4 1285 
France 76.2 83.4 2267 
Greece 76.4 81.4 1210 
UK 76.4 80.9 2016 
Cyprus 76.3 80.8 732 
Austria 76.2 82.1 1910 
Germany 76.1 81.7 1963 
Netherlands 76.2 80.8 2388 
Malta 76.2 80.7 749 
Belgium 75.5 81.6 2017 
Ireland 75.5 80.7 2012 
Finland 75.3 81.9 1647 
Luxemburg 75.0 81.4 2704 
Denmark 75.2 79.6 1664 
Portugal 74.2 81.0 1174 
Slovenia 72.6 80.2 1321 
Czech Rep. 72.4 78.8 1055 
Poland 70.5 78.5 435 
Slovakia 69.7 77.8 677 
Hungary 68.5 76.8 827 
Lithuania 66.5 77.6 400 
Estonia 65.5 76.9 449 
Latvia  64.9 77.6 269 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Table 3.8. Main features of health systems in the EU 
Germany Decentralised system managed by health Funds, practitioners’ associations and 
hospital groups. Health legislation is public. Spending is high.  
Belgium  Public universal insurance. Free access to health care. 22% of spending paid by 
patients. Ceiling of spending to be paid by patients. High spending and high rise in 
spending. Introduction of an objective of rate of growth of spending.  
Denmark Universal insurance. Free hospital spending. Health care are managed by regions. 
16% of spending paid by patients.  
Ireland NHS supplemented by a voluntary private insurance system (covering 44% of the 
population. 22% of spending paid by patients. Insufficient supply.  
Greece NHS supplemented by a private insurance system. 46% of spending remain paid by 
patients. 
Spain NHS supplemented by a private insurance system. GP gate-keeper. 23% of spending  
paid by patients. Spending is relatively low. 
France Health insurance, universal coverage and supplementary insurance. Free access. 
High and rising spending. Annual target for spending growth.  
Italy  NHS, regionalised plus supplementary insurance. GP gate-keeping. 20% of spending  
paid by patients. Plan of rationalization. 
Portugal NHS and supplementary insurance. 29% of spending paid by patients. High 
spending. 
Sweden NHS managed by regions and towns. GP as gate keepers. 13% of spending paid by 
patients. High spending. 
UK NHS, free health care but long waiting time. 
Netherlands Compulsory private insurance in competition, but under regulation. High spending. 
Finland NHS managed by municipalities. GP as gate-keepers. 
Austria Health insurance, almost universal coverage with GP as gate-keepers. 26% of 
spending paid by patients. Relatively low spending. 
 
In the field of health and long-term care, the OMC should allow the exchange of experience 
and ‘good practices’ in order to improve health and reduce costs. Three objectives must be 
simultaneously achieved, according to the Barcelona European Council of March 2002: equal 
access to health for everyone, high level of health quality, long-term financial sustainability. 
The joint report by the Commission and the Council ‘Supporting national strategies for the 
future of health care and care for the elderly’, March 2003 justifies Union’s action for three 
reasons: health policies must comply with the internal market rules of free movement of 
persons, of goods and of services and free provision of services (but are these worries crucial 
in the health area?), the EU has a responsibility in the area of public health (Article III – 278,  
Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe). Last the EU must monitor the long-term 
sustainability of public finances (but countries should be allowed to raise their health 
expenditure if households agree to finance the rise). The 2004 Communication tries to make a 
link between health and employment, insisting on health problems for people at risk of social 
exclusion, employment in the health and long-term care sectors.  
The 2007 Communication summarises the first year of the OMC. All countries commit 
themselves to entitling the access to all for adequate care, but in practice they ask for a rising 
share of spending to be paid by patients, even if there are cases with 100% payment and 
expenditure ceilings. The share of non covered health spending is higher than 30% in 
Portugal, Austria, the Netherlands, Latvia and Greece (48%), Cyprus (52%). Long-term care 
should be professional (and not left to families and women) and its funding should increase 
and become autonomous and guaranteed. Insufficient labour supply appears in some countries 
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(nurses and other workers in the health sector). In some countries health supply is insufficient 
which generates waiting times and rationing. Some countries find they spend too much on 
health. But the OMC does not really address the issue of the diversity of health systems, their 
governance, the appropriate methods to reduce cost. Until now there have been non EU 
strategy promoted for health. There is a strong contradiction between recognising the need for 
higher spending and financial constraints (which lead to try to reduce public employment and 
expenditure, to prefer private to public insurance. The OMC does not address directly major 
issues: how to finance a rising share in health spending? How to conciliate a satisfactory level 
of health spending insurance and to give incentives to households to reduce their 
consumption?   How to supervise the behaviour of health suppliers? How to finance long-term 
care spending: universal benefits (everyone would be entitled to long-term care spending 
reimbursement, but this would be very costly, assistance benefits (benefits would be targeted 
to the poorer and be refundable on wealth and inheritance), mandatory private insurance.  
3.4. Unemployment benefits 
Unemployment insurance spending is high in Scandinavian countries (in particular in 
Denmark and also in the Netherlands) and very low in Mediterranean countries and in the UK 
(see Tables 1.2 and 3.9). Two models seem efficient in terms of full-employment: the liberal 
model with low unemployment benefits, flexible wages, but also with full-employment being 
obtained at the price of a significant number of poor workers, the Danish model where 
unemployment benefits are high and are accompanied by substantial training efforts and 
activation policy for bringing the unemployed to back into employment. It is therefore 
difficult to set EU objectives in terms of replacement rates, but the Danish model seems more 
in line with the ESM. 
Until recently, it was however difficult to apply the Danish model in large heterogeneous 
countries with high unemployment. Training and support to some groups of the population 
(low-skilled, long-term unemployed, older workers, the young, single mothers with young 
children) was difficult to implement in a context where labour demand was too low. In the 
years to come, the deceleration of labour supply growth and a more robust GDP growth may 
make it easier to implement such a policy.  
The future of the incapacity benefits system is an issue in several countries, because the 
system is costly (Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Denmark) and reduces activity rates 
significantly (Finland, Italy, Sweden, UK). Conversely, incapacity benefits can be a flexible 
and adapted way at the individual level to tackle the issue of older workers in declining 
industries. But the schemes need to remain flexible and potentially adjusted when the 
economy comes close to full-employment.  
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Table 3.9. Employment policy expenditures, 2005 
 Spending % of GDP  Generosity* 
(%) Active Passive Unemp. rate Active Passive 
Germany 0.97 2.35 11.3 8.6 20.8 
Austria  0.62 1.51 5.2 11.9 29.0 
Belgium  1.08 2.37 8.1 13.3 29.3 
Denmark 1.74 2.51 4.2 41.4 59.8 
Spain   0.78 1.45 9.2 8.5 15.8 
Finland 0.89 1.90 8.5 10.5 22.4 
France 0.90 1.62 9.9 9.1 16.4 
Greece 0.05 0.35 9.8 0.5 9.7 
Ireland 0.63 0.83 4.3 14.7 19.3 
Italy 0.54 0.82 7.8 6.9 10.5 
Netherlands 1.33 2.02 5.2 25.5 38.9 
Portugal 0.69 1.39 8.1 8.5 17.2 
Sweden 1.32 1.20 7.8 16.9 15.4 
UK 0.49 0.19 4.7 10.5 4.0 
* Unemployment expenditures/Unemployment rate 
Source: OECD. 
3.5 Family Policy 
Family policy has until now not been a topic for discussion and coordination at the EU level 
although it has been addressed in some recent reports (like the Report of the High level group 
on the future of social policy, May 2004). However, fertility rates are higher than 1.8 in only 
two countries - France and Ireland - out of the EU-15 countries and below 1.4 in six countries. 
Countries with very low fertility rates are likely to have very high dependency ratios in the 
future: Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and to a lesser extent Germany and Austria, despite high 
immigration flows. Population is likely to fall substantially in Portugal (4% until 2050), 
Germany (6%) and Italy (7%). Rising birth rates is a crucial issue for these countries. In 
particular, the preservation of their pays-as-you go pension system will be will be questioned 
if birth rates do not raise or net immigration does not grow substantially. 
Family policy should include thee main elements:  
- Allowing mothers with young children to work, which is the best way to prevent the 
poverty risk and to give women incentives to have children. This requires a childcare system 
available everywhere and financed by public spending. Countries with low fertility rates are 
also countries with the lowest female activity rates (Greece, Italy). A contrario, some 
countries succeed in combining high fertility rates and high female activity rates: Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden and France. These countries have a high level of pre-primary care and 
education spending (see Table 2.8) and also relatively high level of family policy expenditure 
(see Table 1.2). 
- Ensuring that all children have a minimum income level, health and education. 
Accounting for the importance of education from the younger age in terms of school 
education and in the future society, European societies cannot spoil the potential of children 
of poorest classes.  They must benefit from social services like specific hep for education, 
health and cultural activities. A minimum income must be ensured to families (even if this 
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reduces the incentive to work for parents. Table 3.9 shows that child poverty rates are higher 
that adult poverty rates in many countries: the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, the UK and Portugal. 
Social assistance targeted at poor families should be increased.  
- Family benefits and income taxation should ensure similar income levels for families 
and couples without children earning the same income. Table 9 shows that family benefits are 
too low in all EU countries: to have the same income level than a couple, a family with two 
children should have in extra-income of 40% according to OECD scale ; it has in fact between  
13 % (Austria) and 1.5% (Spain).  
Table 3.10. Activity rates and fertility rates 
 Activity rates 15-55 year-old Fertility rates 
(%) Male 2005 Female 2005 2005 
Germany  93.6 79.1 1.34 
Austria  92.8 79.9 1.40 
Belgium  91.8 76.8 1.64 
Denmark 91.1 84.1 1.80 
Spain   92.4 69.0 1.35 
Finland 90.3 85.2 1.80 
France 93.8 80.7 1.94 
Greece 94.7 68.3 1.33 
Ireland 92.2 69.6 1.86 
Italy 91.2 63.6 1.31 
Netherlands 91.4 77.8 1.71 
Portugal 92.5 81.8 1.40 
Sweden 92.4 86.5 1.77 
UK 90.9 77.5 1.78 
Source: European Commission, 2005. 
Table 3.11. Extra income for a family with two children as compared to a couple * 
( %) 2006 
Germany  11.3 
Austria  13.3 
Belgium  12.6 
Denmark 8.2 
Spain   1.5 
Finland 7.7 
France 8.2 
Greece 7.9 
Ireland 9.6 
Italy 6.4 
Netherlands 7.6 
Portugal 6.1 
Sweden 8.5 
UK 6.6 
* Husband earning the average wage, wife 33% of the average wage. 
Source: Taxing wages, 2005. 
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At the European level, the countries should commit themselves on some objectives: 
availability of childcare, child poverty rates, minimal income for families with children, 
relative income for families with children. 
3.6. Fight against poverty and social exclusion  
Poverty rates vary quite substantially in the EU, from around 9-12% in social-democrat 
countries to around 18-20% in Liberal and Southern countries (see table 3.12). Poverty results 
mainly from insufficient family and pension benefits and from precarious jobs, with low 
wages.  
In almost all EU-15 countries, there is a minimum income amounting to around 50% of the 
median income (and thus it does not prevent individuals from falling into poverty at 60%). 
The minimum income system is more generous in Denmark and much less so in Southern 
countries. The marginal income tax rate for incomes rising from the minimum income to 
wages at the level of 50% of the median wage is higher than 80% in most countries; it is of 
course lower than 50% in Southern countries, but there are nevertheless quite a lot of 
unemployed or poor people in these countries.  
Table 3.12. Poverty rates in the EU, 2005 
 Total 0-15 year-old 16-25 year-old Older than 65 
EU-15 16 18 18 20 
Sweden 9 8 23 11 
Netherlands 11 16 16 5 
Denmark 12 10 29 18 
Finland 12 10 22 18 
Austria 12 15 13 14 
Germany  13 13 14 15 
France 13 14 18 16 
Belgium  15 19 17 21 
UK 18 22 19 26 
Italy 19 24 23 23 
Spain 20 24 18 29 
Greece 20 19 23 28 
Portugal 20  24 20 28 
Ireland 20 22 19 33 
Source : Eurostat. 
 
The OMC on social inclusion was launched in 2000. The objective was to bring a ‘decisive 
contribution of the eradication of poverty and social exclusion by the year 2010’, but poverty 
rates have hardly decreased in the EU since 2000. Social exclusion has risen in the EU from 
the 1980’s and social protection systems have no tool or institutions to tackle this. Owing to 
the OMC, all countries have been requested to include the fight against poverty as a new 
element of their social protection system. In 2000, the Communication focused on the need 
for people to be in employment, the right for all to financial resources (although without 
imposing minimum income standards), preventing exclusion, supporting the more vulnerable, 
and involving all players. But contradictions were not between minimum income and work 
incentive, between economic modernisation of social protection (that leads companies to be 
more demanding on the quality of their workers) and inclusion. The joint report in 2002 
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showed the link between social expenditure as a share of GDP and the reduction of the at risk 
poverty. A large number of indicators were introduced to account for the different aspects of 
exclusion. The Communication from 2005 highlighted 7 priorities: being in employment; 
modernising social protection, inequalities in education and training, child poverty, right to 
decent housing, entitlement to social services, fight against discrimination. The 2007 
Communication focused on the fight against child poverty. This raises the issue of the return 
of their parents in work, of combating school failure and of the integration of immigrant 
children. The fight for active inclusion aims to facilitate the return to work, but the risk is that 
this is obtained by deteriorating the situation of those who do not find a job.  
Table 3.13. Minimum income levels in 2005 
  Single people Couple, 2 children At-risk of poverty 
line  
Marginal income 
tax**, % 
Germany 672 1590 856 89 
Belgium 625 1185 822 66 
Denmark 1173 3333 1106 103 
Greece No minimum income  471 16 
Spain At the regional level  529 47 
France 667 1264 796 80 
Ireland 718 1341 936 88 
Italy 250 542 719 14 
Netherlands 549 1099 849 93 
Austria 414 1090 900 87 
Portugal 171 515 359 54 
Finland 362* 1079 870 81 
Sweden 364* 1094 865 98 
UK 704 1690 936 78 
* Excl. Housing. ** 
Source: European Commision. 
 
All in all the value added of the OMC lacks visibility because no numerical targets were 
announced and no strategy is adopted due to the diversity of national systems. An advantage 
of the OMC could be to bring highlight the issue of poverty situations and to be an incentive 
for countries to set ambitious objectives but the work of the OMC is not really advertised. It 
would be more effective to set out common objectives in terms of poverty rates, child poverty 
rates, minimum incomes (as a % of the poverty line). 
4. What future for social Europe?  
‘Social Europe’ has various meanings. It may refer to the current intervention of European 
authorities in the fields of social protection and employment legislation, as a complement or 
sometimes as a substitute to national institutions interventions. The role of European 
authorities is clearly stated in European Treaties that assert that MS remain responsible for 
their social protection. At the same time, the logic of European construction, the rising 
interdependence of economies, the interconnection of economic and monetary issues lead 
European authorities to tend to increase their role in social issues and to pilot ‘the 
modernisation’ of national social protection systems.  
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But social Europe may also refer to a political project, aiming at increasing the power of 
European authorities in social areas: there would be a social Europe like there is today an 
economic or monetary Europe. This social Europe would lead to unify gradually European 
social systems. This would imply a transfer of sovereignty which would be questionable since 
the role of social partners would be reduced and there would be no guarantee on the content of 
this social Europe, possibly moving towards a liberal or social-democrat system. Social 
Europe may imply a step back in social democracy in Europe. At the same time the explicit 
recognition that Social Europe exists and that it should be managed in an open and democratic 
way, could be a progress as compared to a situation of constrained convergence.  
Last, Social Europe may refer to a political project aiming at deepening the European Social 
Model, by unifying social protection, redistribution and employment legislation towards the 
top. This could take place through the gradual introduction of social norms in each country at 
high and progressively similar levels. But there is no consensus in Europe on the content of 
this social Europe.  
4.1. Convergence or preservation of national specificities?  
All EU countries need to reform their social protection systems in face of financing 
constraints, and of world and domestic social and economic changes. Since they face similar 
problems, this could be the opportunity to implement a convergence strategy. However, there 
have been up to now very few common reforms in Europe even if some convergences have 
been emerging. For instance, the reforms of social protection financing (like the introduction 
of IRAP in Italy or CSG in France, the VAT rise in Germany) have remained national. A 
minimum wage has been introduced in the UK but not in Germany – although this is currently 
debated). Two Member States only have adopted notional accounts for their pensions 
systems: Italy and Sweden. Moreover, the EU enlargement complicates convergence policies. 
Issues that were difficult to tackle in the EU-15 become almost unrealistic to address in the 
EU-27 (Vaugham-Whitehead, 2005). Three justifications may be given in favour of 
convergence: facilitating economic integration, originating a European citizenship, preventing 
a social competition race to the bottom.  
The diversity of systems in the EU is difficult for European companies. They have to handle a 
variety of regimes, which is costly and raises delicate issues in terms of comparability of 
workers’ earnings according to their workplace. Diversity will be hardly sustainable if 
European integration strengthens. New issues will emerge in permanence, such as: what 
legislation does apply to a Spanish worker working for a French company in Poland? Who 
will pay for the family and health allowances of this worker? But the merging of the existing 
systems into a single one that would facilitate the work of European companies is difficult to 
design. European companies could be offered to opt for a new 28th regime, but offering a 
choice in this area would be dangerous. A system that would cover only well-paid and healthy 
employees of big European companies would necessarily be more generous for these workers 
if they did not have to care financially for poorer European workers and the socially excluded. 
Competition between continental, Anglo-Saxon, central and eastern European countries could 
lead to the end of the continental model that is characterised by a large redistribution between 
heterogeneous groups of the population. Companies will not locate their production in 
countries where the well-paid are too heavily taxed. The young will prefer to settle in 
countries where social contributions and tax rates are the lowest. In the end, the remaining 
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systems will be those accepting strong inequalities (the Anglo-Saxon model) or benefiting to 
a relatively homogeneous society (the Scandinavian system). Continental countries could 
have no choice but move towards the liberal model through a painful period of imbalances. 
Europe could therefore decide to avoid a race to the bottom. However this risk has not 
materialised yet and the threat remains theoretical (see Table 1.1). The risk is limited because 
social protection is both a cost and a benefit for the economically active. In countries where 
social protection is high, workers are entitled to health, pension, unemployment and family 
benefits as a counterpart of their contributions: the system is therefore on average not a 
burden for workers. Assistance payments are a burden, but they are generally funded by 
taxation. However higher wage earners bear a specific burden in too redistributive systems; 
the profitability of the pay-as-you-go pensions’ system can be lower than that of pension 
funds. The social competition requires us to great vigilance: social protection systems are 
doomed to be effective and not be too redistributive. 
The debate around the services directive, the so-called Bolkestein directive, illustrated 
unsettled legal issues arising from contradictions between the Internal Market’s rules and the 
national characteristics of employment legislation and social protection. Entitling services 
companies to be under ‘the origin principle’ and restricting the possibilities of control of 
employees by the authorities of the countries where they work would have allowed companies 
to choose their location only from social and taxation considerations and to practice tax 
dumping as compared to companies located in more demanding countries in terms of social 
standards. This would have increased substantially the field of competing goods. Moreover, 
the notion of services was not precisely defined, with public services (health, education) being 
threatened to comply to competition rules, and in particular that of not receiving public 
subsidies. But these services must be allowed to remain public under the rules of the ESM.  
Last, European construction implies that social and political life becomes progressively 
‘European’ which would be facilitated by the convergence of social protection systems. The 
objective is to ‘create an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’. European 
construction would be of more interest for the peoples if they could see visible implications in 
terms of social protection. In that respect, the European Commission tries to intervene more in 
social issues, although in the absence of any constitutional and democratic framework. The 
European Court of Justice intervenes already in the field of social protection, and some 
harmonisation piloted for instance by the European Parliament would be preferable to a 
harmonisation implemented by the ECJ alone, where the Internal Market requirements would 
prevail over social protection issues. Similar social protection all over EU countries would 
facilitate similar economic policy answers in the occurrence of shocks and hence would 
facilitate economic policy coordination. In the longer run, EU countries are unlikely to be able 
to choose deeply different strategies in the field of social protection (for instance some 
countries favouring the postponement of retirement age and some others a rise in social 
contributions). 
A certain degree of convergence seems necessary, but towards which model? Can 
convergence take place if national models are deeply anchored in different social institutions 
and practices? Social systems cannot be unified at the EU level, without accounting for 
national traditions, debates and specificities. Building a European social protection in that 
way would be at the expense of the role of national social partners and would weaken the 
support for social protection. In most Member States, the social protection system is linked to 
trade unions, either through a joint management by employers and employees’ trade unions 
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(Bismarkian model), or because trade unions have imposed it at the political level 
(Scandinavian model). Can the management of social protection be handed at the European 
level, without risk to break this link?  Such a strategy could lead to unify systems towards the 
bottom in the name of competitiveness rather than to the development of a rejuvenated ESM. 
All social protection systems are based on solidarity. Solidarity remains today widely 
national. Countries with low unemployment rates are not willing to pay for countries where 
unemployment rates are high, because they consider that high unemployment rates are due to 
insufficient domestic efforts. It seems unlikely that in a 20-year time scale, the French or the 
British will agree to pay social contributions for the pensions of the Italians or the Germans, 
where fertility rates will have been too low.  
According to Boeri (2004) and Lejour (2007) for instance, the Treaty of Maastricht have 
applied the subsidiarity principle in arranging the division of competencies between 
individual Member States and the EU. Centralised European coordination must be justified by 
strong scale or external effects; but these effects are not really present in social security 
expenditures and labour market regulations. Boeri rejects harmonisation in the name of the 
respect of national preferences expressed by the democratic process and the advantage of 
efficiency of decentralisation. Competition should be allowed to play between national 
systems. It is not possible to a single European social model, as model have to account for 
country-specific institutional networks. There is no risk of a race-to-the-bottom in social 
areas. There is no evidence that social protection schemes have been dismantled in the EU. 
However, it could be wise to coordinate minimum incomes schemes in order to avoid the 
potential risk of ‘social nomadism’ through a last resort assistance. According to Lejour,  
harmonisations of social regulations would be expensive for the new Member States and will 
not match their level of economic development: the preferences for social standards are 
simply different for rich and poor countries. Differences in regulations need not in fact be 
harmful; they can help the economic development of new Member States because they will be 
able to attract more capital and strengthen their competitiveness with lower social standards. 
Western European consumers will ultimately also benefit from this through increased trade 
and specialisation. Convergence could then subsequently lead to adaptation of social policy to 
the EU norms. If high social standards are imposed on the new Member States immediately, 
this could make it more difficult for them to achieve the growth necessary to catch up with the 
West.  
These views imply that there is no further progress for a European citizenship. Besides one 
may wonder what competition between social systems may mean in a situation of free 
movement. Will countries where redistribution is the higher be able to stand competition from 
less redistributive countries, knowing that the wealthiest will leave the country while the 
poorest will settle there? There is not evidence that competition lead to a satisfactory system.  
4.2. Social Europe in action  
Europe intervenes in three respects in the social area: Legislation (or hard law), financial 
support, coordination processes (or soft law) 
4.2.1. The ‘hard law’  
The ‘hard law’ represents all legislative EU decisions. Initially, Treaties allowed European 
institutions to intervene in specific areas: free movement of workers, coordination of social 
security systems, health and safety at the workplace, gender equality and more generally fight 
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against discrimination. The first two elements are justified by the Internal Market, the third 
one may be justified by the objective of not seeing economic competition run at the expense 
of workers; the fourth element can only be justified by the objective of building a European 
Society sharing common values.  
The Single European Act introduced in 1987 focuses on the need for an economic and social 
cohesion. Qualified majority voting is allowed for some issues, like workers’ protection at the 
workplace; collective bargaining is promoted and favoured, but harmonisation of social 
protection systems has not been associated with the Internal market. 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe recalls the Union’s objectives: ‘a highly 
competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress […]. It 
shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and 
protection’. The annual Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and employment is enshrined in 
the constitution. The Treaty embeds the EU Charter of fundamental rights that includes social 
rights but under hardly binding specifications: workers have a right to work, but not to have a 
job: rights are recognised as in the national legislations, no minimum benefit is stated. 
The majority of the Union’s actions in the social field remain subject to a unanimity vote 
(social security and social protection of workers, protection of workers where their 
employment contract is terminated, representation and collective defence of the interests of 
workers and employers, conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing 
in Union territory. They are clearly stated in the framework of European Treaties, notably 
under the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (art. 5). Some elements are explicitly 
excluded from the European field (pay, right of association, right to strike and right to impose 
lockouts): there is for instance no possibility to set a EU minimum wage.  
All in all, the Union’s role in the Social field applies more to employment policy than to 
social protection broadly speaking. The Union has tried to promote the social dialogue and to 
introduce common rights for EU workers (health, safety, non discrimination). But the Union 
has no power in terms of organisation of social protection (pensions, health or unemployment 
insurance, family). 
The Union faces a growing difficulty: liberal countries and the new MS are reluctant to accept 
binding legislation. The working time directive has thus being emptied of its content with the 
existence of an opt-out clause, permitting Member States not to apply the maximum 48-hour 
limit, on the basis of voluntary agreements with individual workers. 
The European Commission and the ECJ also play an indirect role in the social field through 
their prerogatives in economic policy coordination (government borrowing, level of public 
spending), competition, free movement and free establishment.  
The EU legislative actions in social protection seem to have reached a limit. There is no 
agreement between the Commission and the MS to make significant progress in that direction. 
The diversity of social models and the unanimity principle prevent any progress. 
4.2.2. Financial support  
Financial support in the social field is extremely limited. The ESF co-finances local projects 
of active labour market policies but with relatively low resources (0.1% of the EU GDP). 
Financial support in the social field is constrained by the absence of EU solidarity, by the 
denial to give own resources to the EU and the difficulty to implement transfers between 
countries with different incomes levels and different institutions. For instance, some have 
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suggested that unemployment allowances be considered at the EU level and this would allow 
for contra-cyclical transfers. But this would mean that MS are no more responsible for their 
unemployment benefits systems. Moreover, it seems difficult to settle a European system 
where the unemployed will receive higher allowance in richest countries. It seems also 
difficult that countries in a full-employment situation accept to pay for countries in high 
employment.  
 
Box 2. European globalisation adjustment funds 
The creation of the ‘European globalisation adjustment fund’ was decided by the Commission in 
March 2006. This fund could be a positive element for the future of Social Europe. It recognises that 
there are workers affected by globalisation. In practice, the fund will only provide a support to the 
direct victims of globalisation, to workers in an industry sector directly hit by competition from low-
wage countries. The fund is intended to help their reconversion (retraining, mobility). The 
fund will not facilitate job creation or help people keep their job, although in most cases a 
whole geographical area is hurt and new job opportunities are limited. With this fund, some social 
expenditure will be directly covered by the EU : it is an attempt to raise the EU budget and influence. 
However, the current expenditure ceiling is very low (500 million euros per year, i.e. 0.2% of MS 
unemployment allowances spending). It will not help the recovery of industrial employment in 
Europe. If it is recognised that globalisation as a whole makes victims (low skilled workers) and 
winners (high skilled workers, capital income earners), the fund does not allow for transfers of the 
magnitude of the challenge. 
 
4.2.3. Coordination processes (or soft law)  
Coordination processes (or soft law) include the definition of common EU objectives 
(BEPGs, Lisbon Agenda, Social Agenda). In the social field, they allow European authorities 
to intervene in areas that are not of their competence according to the Treaties. Since 2000, 
MS and the Commission concert according to the Open method of coordination (OMC). The 
objective is to stimulate converging reforms in national social models, in sharing national 
experience and ‘best practices’.  
The EPC, the SPC, the Commission and the Council give periodic guidelines on the evolution 
of ‘social protection in the European Union’, even if social protection in the EU does not exist 
as such and if the legitimacy of EU authorities in the field of social protection is weak. Over 
the last ten years, the most relevant texts have been:   
- Modernising and improving social protection in the European Union (1997) 
According to the Commission, social protection systems (SPS) need to be modernised in 
Europe. The ESM must be preserved and consolidated because the increased flexibility of 
economic life requests that SPS provide safety. But population ageing will have high costs, 
and there is also a need to increase fertility. The suggested solution is to ‘make social 
protection more job friendly’: to raise work incentives; cut means-tested benefits (at the risk 
of higher inequality), to turn unemployment allowances into an active support to training, to 
cut taxes on labour (but what would be the alternative resources?), to raise incentives to work 
longer, to offer integration contracts to those under minimum incomes. The financial 
sustainability of public pensions systems must be ensured, supplementary regimes must be 
supervised, schemes for long-term care must be introduced. The report suggests the 
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introduction of market mechanisms in health insurance albeit warning against adverse 
selection. It is in favour of individual social rights while recognising the risks of increased 
poverty for some women.  
- The Lisbon Strategy (March 2000) 
The European Council launched the Lisbon Strategy (‘becoming the more competitive and 
dynamic knowledge economy in the word, able to promote durable economic growth 
accompanied by a quantitative and qualitative improvement of jobs and a better social 
cohesion’). Social policy is requested to adapt to external (globalisation) and domestic 
(ageing, Lisbon Strategy) changes. Higher employment rates (rising from 61% to 70%) will 
ensure Social security financing. The objective of modernisation of social protection is 
restated, with the four objectives mentioned earlier, and this will be achieved owing to the 
work of SPC and OMC: make work pay; make pension systems sustainable; promote social 
integration; ensure high quality and sustainability of health care. The fight against poverty and 
social exclusion is promoted as a priority objective, the SPC being asked to set relevant 
indicators.   
This social element of the agenda is developed in the ‘Agenda for social policy’ that 
promotes “to strengthen the role of social policy as a productive factor”. This agenda aims at 
more interaction between economic, social and employment policies and to involve all people 
involved in the Lisbon strategic framework: fiscal policies must remain sustainable; wage 
moderation must be implemented; markets of goods, services and capital must be reformed; 
tax policies must be coordinated. The agenda does not try to harmonise social policies, but to 
define common objectives and facilitate coordination in the framework of the Internal market. 
Social protection remains under the responsibility of the MS, but some cooperation at the EU 
level should address the challenges of globalisation. In terms of social policy, suggestions are 
limited; the four objectives are simply recalled; the promotion of social inclusion is a priority 
objective, but without any precise suggestion.  
The Kok report (2004) reassesses the Lisbon strategy at half-way. It does not address social 
protection itself. Social protection is subordinated to employment policy. The 2005 Social 
Agenda is relatively modest (12 pages). The objective of modernisation of the ESM is 
considered according to two major elements: (1) Employment (2) Equal opportunities and 
inclusion. The major new element in the Agenda is an intergenerational approach which 
stresses the needs of the young and families. The Commission announces that it will open a 
debate on national minimum income schemes  
Social protection in a strict acceptation has not really emerged at the EU level. Because of 
divergent views between countries, there are few debates on the basic objectives of social 
protection and on social models. The question of the convergence between social models 
deserves to be raised in face of European economic integration. Social policy is often not 
considered for itself, with its own social protection objectives but like an element of 
employment polices. The BEPGs claim for public spending cuts. But social protection 
expenditures represent substantial budget components and are likely to be affected by these 
cuts. The EMU, globalisation and demographic ageing place EU countries’ social policies in 
front of common challenges. A common strategy would be necessary. It requires delicate 
choices between social concerns and economic constraints. These choices are essentially 
political. MS start from very different situations; they can make different choices. Vis-a-vis 
this diversity, there is no authority who could design convergence strategies; there is no 
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democratic process that could support such strategies; there are no social forces which could 
carry them. The dialogue processes aim at tackling these weaknesses, but they are limited to 
debates between European and national technocracies, which is not sufficient.    
4.3. The open method of coordination 
The strategy currently implemented by the Commission consists mainly in modernising social 
protection systems through a common elaboration of the Member States piloted by the 
Commission through the open method of coordination.  
European social policy has been unable to progress through legislation in the area of social 
protection although the need for strengthening European cooperation was increasing, namely 
to address the risks of social regression due to the deepening of the Internal Market (see Erhel 
and Palier, 2005). Since 1992 and the Maastricht Treaty, the number of directives proposed 
and adopted has diminished. The signing of the Amsterdam Treaty has not affected this trend 
even if the Title on Employment was introduced. The promotion of the social dialogue has not 
been more fruitful, with only three collective agreements leading to directives. 
The OMC tries to reach a certain convergence in the area of social protection through a non 
binding coordination process, based on the exchange of information and dialogue between 
MS. It is in fact easier to influence national policies by other means than binding rules in the 
presence of interdependent and complex institutional systems. Coordination remains the only 
supranational tool allowing for the respect of irreducible disparities. 
If the subsidiarity principle must be enforced, the OMC is a way of getting around it in social 
areas. In practice, MS and the Commission take part in the OMC. In each area, common 
general objectives are announced, action plans are elaborated and national reports are 
produced where MS explain the policy measures they intend to implement in order to reach 
the common objectives. These plans and strategies are assessed by the Commission and the 
Council in joint reports, delivered at European Councils. The Social protection Committee is 
the link between the Commission and the Council. The whole process is an intensive 
technocratic process. 
The OMC was launched in three areas: the fight for social inclusion (2000), retirement and 
pension systems (2001) health and long-term care (2004). There are very few externalities in 
these fields that justify an intervention at the EU level. This intervention is justified by the 
need to induce the emergence of ESM values (in terms of social inclusion and health), by the 
need for making converging choices in terms of pension for economic and social reasons.   
It should be noted that there is no OMC in the family area, although the performances differ 
widely among MS in terms of fertility rates, female employment rates, and relative family 
incomes. 
Since 2006, was set up the rationalisation of the OMC, which aims to integrate more OMC 
process to the Lisbon Strategy and to the Employment Guidelines. The three subjects (social 
inclusion, pensions, health care) are integrated to a single document and a joint debate. This 
renewal was intended to give visibility to this process, but this objective has not been 
achieved. 
4.4 What is the impact of the OMC? 
Three views can be found on the usefulness of the OMS (Pochet, 2001). According to the first 
view, the OMC hides the very social policy at the EU level. It would allow each country to 
follow the policy of their choice without taking care of EU non binding recommendations. 
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The ‘confidential’ character of the OMC and its absence from national debates tends to 
validate this view.  
According to a second view, the OMC prevents the occurrence of too large divergences that 
would be detrimental to European economic integration (like ‘social tourism’ and ‘social 
dumping’). The OMC could also possibly allow for some convergence of strategies. This 
view accepts that there can be several models in Europe, albeit insisting on the need for a 
common framework with no risk of social dumping.  
According to a third view, the OMC expresses a clear objective of social policies 
convergence. It would therefore have real influence and effects on MS social policies, but this 
effect would be visible only in the long term. Accounting for initial very different situations, 
the OMC would be more efficient than rules through directives.  
In fact the OMC does not seem to have had a direct influence on the national reforms of social 
policies. In most cases, the national debate on reforms does not refer to a European strategy. 
In the fields of exclusion, pensions, health, many reforms were implemented before the 
introduction of the OMC. Last, there is an issue of political opportunity: politicians generally 
prefer not to mention a European reference. 
However, if the OMC does not seem to have direct effects, it may still have some effect. The 
OMC gives more weight to social issues, primarily through its peer assessment system and 
the binding ‘name and shame’ process. There would be a learning process, or the elaboration 
of a common knowledge linked to the OMC and the exchange of information on national 
experience and best practice. The tools of the OMC (indicators, guidelines, models, 
justifications) are resources for national policy makers that can be used in the definition of 
national policies. Thus the OMC has obliged all countries to put the ‘inclusion’ topic on their 
agenda. The ‘health’ and ‘pensions’ OMC oblige countries to take a position in terms of 
sustainability/social needs dilemma. The pensions OMC has revealed the risk of poverty for 
older workers and the deterioration of dependence ratios. In this aspect, European 
coordination would from this respect a ‘leverage effect’ on national policies. 
The OMC gives a new reference for social areas and allows policy-makers to legitimate their 
position and possibly use the OMC in the national debate. National policy-makers can agree 
on rules in Brussels and say at home that there are under EU constraints. The gap widens 
between those who take part in EU discussions and those who do not. Last some think that the 
European Employment Strategy had increased the involvement of social partners in the 
definition of labour market policies guidelines. This is however very arguable for the social 
OMC.  
The OMC is the a priori impossible aggregation of contradictory national objectives, some 
European convergence in the respect of national specificities, since policy measures remain to 
be taken at the national level. However, social protection issues were debated traditionally in 
most EU countries with a social dialogue between the government, the civil society, 
employers and employees’ trade unions. Despite its social focus, the OMC takes place within 
closed doors: national parliaments and the European Parliament do not take part in the process 
(reports are delivered to the Council but are not sent to the Parliament for consultation). 
National social forces are not involved. The OMC places the debate at an inter-government 
level, between high level representatives of the ministries for finance and social affairs. Can 
these representatives present the national strategy in terms of pensions? Can they give the 
view point of their countries on reforms in partner countries? The process is more a 
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discussion between administrations and is poor in comparison with discussions at the national 
level where the diversity of people involved is better represented. The European and national 
high technocracies agree on a common strategy in the social field. The OMS represents in that 
respect a step back in the social and democratic debate.  
4.5. The Lisbon strategy  
If we take a more general view, it appears that the European Commission does not 
recommend a pure liberal solution, but a mixed strategy based on a sound macroeconomic 
policy, increasing markets flexibility, social protection reforms but also public support for 
research and innovation. This is the strategy embedded in the Lisbon Agenda, which raises 
implementation and contents issues.  
The Lisbon strategy was from the beginning a technocratic project, without democratic 
debate, without mobilization of the European opinion, involvement of the civil society and of 
social partners. The strategy did not take in account the differences between the countries, the 
trade-off necessary between various objectives, and the differences of opinion and interest of 
the social forces. The majority of the objectives of the Lisbon Agenda are related to research, 
innovation, higher education and have little impact for the majority of people. Short-term 
issues were forgotten. The European institutions are used to implement policies which experts 
or elites consider economically sound but which are unpopular. We will discuss here the latest 
version of the Lisbon Agenda: the 24 integrated guidelines for growth and jobs (2005-2008) 
adopted in July 2005.  
A sound macroeconomic strategy?  
The 6 guidelines on macroeconomic strategy repeat the need for sound macroeconomic 
policies to support growth. Guidelines 1 and 6 repeat that countries must have medium-term 
budgetary positions in balance. Countries running deficits must cut their structural deficits by 
at least of 0.5 percentage point per year, whatever the economic context. The link between the 
single monetary policy and national fiscal policies is not questioned. Guideline 2 asks the MS 
to adapt to the ageing of their population by reducing public debt (but population ageing 
involves a rise in the savings rate, therefore demand for public debt), to reform their pensions 
and health systems (but how?) and finally to raise employment rates. But the strong growth 
strategy needed to reach these aims is not organized. Guideline 3 requires that public 
expenditure should be reallocated towards research, infrastructure, teaching. But the 
expenditures to be cut are not specified. Guideline 4 requires that MS make structural reforms 
to facilitate the implementation of sound macroeconomic policies. One could prefer the 
opposite: to implement coordinated expansionary macroeconomic policies to facilitate the 
implementation of structural reforms.  
Microeconomic strategy: competition and innovation…   
The central objective is to raise productivity and innovation in Europe. EU-15 GDP per capita 
has remained at 72% of the GDP per head in the US since 1973. But this is primarily 
explained by differences in employment rate, unemployment rate, and annual worked hours 
rather than by productivity per head. On the other hand, since 1995, labour productivity 
growth has slowed down in the EU-15 (1.0%) whereas it has accelerated in the US (to 2.2%). 
This is explained partly by the level of unemployment: innovations saving employment are 
hardly welcome in a mass unemployment situation.  
The lessons of the burst of the NITC bubble and the collapse in equity prices are not drawn. 
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Growth through innovation (guideline 8), ITC (guideline 9), development and liberalization 
of financial markets remains the dogma. Guideline 10 recommends strengthening the 
“competitive advantages of the industrial base”. But this policy requires a major change with 
the competition policy of the Commission, which aims at reducing the government aids. 
Guideline 11 discusses ecological concerns, but contradictions between growth and 
environment are not considered. Guideline 12 recommends deepening the “Internal Market”. 
There too, contradictions are not accounted for: is privatisation needed from the energy sector, 
collective transportation system, by forgetting the long term concerns and regional planning? 
The problems arising from the Bolkestein Directive are overlooked: what competition 
between firms subjected to different social standards? Guideline 13 calls for open and 
competitive markets; asks for the reduction of State aid which distorts competition, while 
recognizing the need for curing market deficiencies, helping research, innovation, formation. 
Guideline 14 invites to reduce regulations, as if those were necessarily harmful. For example, 
should consumer protection be given up? Guideline 15 requires to foster entrepreneurship, 
“by a tax system which encourages the success”, which is a calling into question of the 
progressivity of taxation.  
What employment strategy? The myth of flexibility… 
The general principle remains to increase labour force availability and quality. There is no 
suggestion on how to increase job offers. Guideline 17 reaffirms ambitious objectives for 
employment rates (in 2010, 70% for the whole population, 60% for the women, 50% for the 
older workers). Guideline 18 suggests increasing labour demand by lowering young people’s 
unemployment, by giving incentives for women and older workers to work.  Guideline 19 
recommends increasing the gains for employment. But, the call for modernising social 
protection systems is worrying, if it is a question of reducing pensions or unemployment 
benefits or of suppressing retirement possibilities while employment opportunities for senior 
workers are not there yet. 
Guideline 20 proposes to remove the labour mobility barriers, but the sensitive issues are not 
addressed: how to prevent workers from the East from exerting downward pressure on wages 
in the West? Guideline 21 recommends to support flexibility (by reconciling it with the job 
security), to better anticipate better to come and to facilitate the transitions. But the 
recommended strategy is not defined. The Anglo-Saxon or the Scandinavian model?  
Guideline 22 proposes to ensure a trend of wages on line with the productivity and to reduce 
the non-wage costs. Currently the wages tend to progress less quickly than the labour 
productivity in the euro area: the wage share in value added dropped from 67.4% in 2000 to 
66.2% in 2005. It is thus a rise than it is necessary to preach…. The fall of the social 
contributions cannot mean fall of the benefits (which would be the advantage for the workers 
and the firms to decrease the contributions if this reduction obliged them to pay premiums to 
private insurances?). Other resources thus should be defined.  
The integrated guidelines forget that Europe suffers from an insufficient demand and that the 
European framework is partly responsible for it. They refuse to make the Lisbon agenda 
consistent with the SGP, i.e. to take account of capital expenditures to assess MS fiscal 
policy. The text forgets exchange rate policy. Can the euro area be competitive after a rise of 
67% vis-à-vis the dollar since 2002?  The text forgets social Europe. How to reconcile the 
freedom of circulation and establishment with the tax autonomy of the countries? How to 
avoid competition by lowering taxes? How to avoid social dislocation when the winners for 
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globalisation refuse to take part in the national solidarity?  The text forgets the industrial 
policy. Is it necessary to be limited to a policy of the competition and of reduction of the 
government aid?   
4.6. How to adapt the ESM? National reforms or a European pilot?  
Five main views can be found on the future of the ESM.  
1) For Liberals, Europe and globalisation offer the opportunity to abandon an old-fashioned 
social-democrat model that is no more in line with the needs of modern capitalism. Social and 
tax competition, under the impulse of globalisation and Internal Market, will lead EU 
countries, especially continental ones, to dismantle progressively their employment protection 
systems (labour rights, minimum wage) and to liberalise their social protection systems 
(moving from pay-as-you go to pension fund systems, to private health care). Otherwise, 
companies will progressively refuse to settle in these countries and skilled workers to work, 
pay taxes and social contributions there. The ageing of populations and the resulting rise in 
pensions and health spending would not be financed in a global economy since a rise in 
contributions would lead young workers to move abroad. From that point of view, any 
harmonisation would be harmful insofar as it would postpone the necessary changes. There is 
a need to move towards a liberal model, through labour market flexibility, focusing social 
protection on the poorer while letting the market play for the rest of the population. A rise in 
inequalities must be accepted to be in line with world standards.  
But the Liberals do not account for the fact that this move is not desired by the populations. 
Europe would enter a long period of social unrest, social insecurity, inter-generational 
conflicts unfavourable to consumption, trust and economic growth. European Societies may 
decide to opt or not for a liberal model. But European construction should aim at leaving the 
choice open. 
2) For Sovereignists, the Peoples should keep the right to choose their social protection 
framework, all the more that it is tightly linked with domestic institutions and social forces. 
Europe should not intervene in existing national social rights and should be given only the 
task to organise the coexistence of different systems. This is the mainstream view in Nordic 
countries. This is also the British and some new MS view points, although for opposite 
reasons: the fear is that European institutions impose a system harmful for economic 
efficiency 
For how long will domestic disparities remain consistent with the Internal Market, with the 
free movement of goods, capital and services? The Sovereignist view assumes that each 
progress in Economic Europe is associated with measures guaranteeing national sovereignty 
in terms of benefits, taxation and labour legislation. This is a view shared neither by the 
Commission, which is in favour of reducing MS prerogatives, nor by a majority of MS. Can 
European companies with workers in several MS operate under specific domestic 
legislations? Last, some country specificities are questionable (child and old-age poverty in 
some Liberal countries, low employment rates and fertility rates in Mediterranean countries, 
high unemployment in continental countries). Should European construction help the 
reduction in these specificities or should countries tackle these issues? 
3) Very few people suggest a big bang leading to a unified system in Europe. This would raise 
insoluble issues: which system? How to organise in practice the transition phase while 
maintaining the acquired rights? All social protection systems are based on solidarity. But 
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solidarity remains today at the national level and there is no EU solidarity. The only system 
that could be easily extended would be a liberal system with a minimum solidarity. However, 
a move towards a single system, under the effects of increased labour mobility in Europe, the 
development of European companies, increased competition and possibly ECJ’s decisions 
cannot be totally excluded. So the question of the design of a single system can be raised even 
if only from an intellectual point of view. 
4) The proponents of a Social Europe are in favour of a progressive convergence towards a 
unified social model in Europe, embedding a high level of social protection. The introduction 
of a social and economic EU government would allow for the harmonisation of taxation and 
social protection to the top. Social minima (minimum incomes, replacement rates for 
unemployment and pensions benefits) and wage minima would be settled according to the 
level of domestic economic development and would increase in catching-up countries as they 
converge towards the best performing countries. Employees would be more involved in 
companies’ management. Social Europe would allow for the coordination of wage increases 
and hence would have positive demand effects while minimising the unfavourable effects in 
terms of competitiveness. Europe would be able to promote its model at the world level. 
Is there a need for a Social Europe, like there is a monetary Europe, a Stability Pact, an 
Internal Market? The answer is not straightforward. Social progress raises conflicting issues. 
It was driven by workers and their trade unions, who are not involved in technocratic 
processes in Brussels. Thus Social Europe may weaken further the weight of social 
democracy. 
Anglo-Saxon countries and the new MS do not want to be constrained to adopt a model that is 
widely felt to be in crisis today in larger continental countries; a model that has failed to avoid 
high unemployment, rising exclusion and which financial prospects are under question. The 
unification, even progressive, of strongly heterogeneous systems seems difficult to 
implement, both at technical, political and social levels. It would require a larger homogeneity 
than there is today in Europe. It supposes a delicate questioning of national practices: for 
example, some countries do not have a national minimum wage (but minimum wages by 
branch) or a minimum income (social assistance being decentralized). The unification would 
require that a central power in Brussels is able, politically, socially and technically to pilot a 
complex and contradictory mechanism.  
Should Europe be given more powers in the field of social protection and should the principle 
of qualified majority be accepted, knowing that it may lead to a harmonisation either to the 
top or to the bottom? Social democracy - that embeds Keynesianism and redistribution - is no 
more a majority view in Europe. This raises the question of democracy in Europe: can a 
country be constrained to adopt or be forbidden to implement a social reform? How to 
organise an efficient social dialogue in Europe, in order to reform and unify social protection, 
between many partners organised at the national level? If the more efficient model is the 
model where social partners agree to a fine tuning of social policy, labour law and wages, this 
model – like in Scandinavia and the Netherlands -, cannot be easily extended in a vast 
heterogeneous area. 
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Box 3. Enhancing Social Europe (February 7, 2007) 
A declaration for « Enhancing Social Europe » was released in February 2007 by 9 of the 27 Labour 
Ministers (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France Greece, Hungary Italy, Luxembourg, Spain,). It is a 
minority text in Europe. In particular, no Scandinavian country signed. The declaration suggests “to 
strengthen the ESM… by elaborating a vision for the future of Social Europe…by promoting with a 
balanced approach…to adaptations related to globalisation, while ensuring social rights and 
protection enshrined in the European tradition”. The four suggested directions are: employment 
policies and flexicurity (fighting against precarious work; developing minimal social standards); social 
cohesion (preserving the social goals and the universal and solidarity character of social protection 
systems; defining minimum incomes); equal opportunities (supporting rise in the female employment 
rate; strengthening family policies and network of nurseries); a better European social governance 
(evaluating the social impact of all Union policies; developing the European social dialogue) 
 
5) From a Social-Liberal European point of view, European authorities should impulse 
progressive but converging reforms aiming at modernising national social protection systems. 
Such a convergence would be obtained through soft methods, like the BEPGs or the Lisbon 
Agenda, i.e. through a set of objectives elaborated by the Commission and then adopted by 
the European Council, and like the open method of coordination, i.e. the confrontation of 
domestic experience and peer pressure guided by the European Commission. Each country 
would however keep their autonomy in social areas. This process has the advantage of leaving 
national sovereignty intact. But it is necessarily slow and not visible for economic agents and 
populations. Moreover, its content raises questions. The BEPGs and the OMC are dialogue 
processes between European and national administrations and do not really involve social 
players, are hardly debated at the country level and in the general public. How should the 
process be democratised and strengthened? Currently the process is not mobilising and does 
not lead to the emergence of a Social Europe project, in the acceptance 2 and 3 of this 
concept. In practice the role of European authorities stands between supporting a specific 
ESM and questioning it under the name of modernisation.  
Conclusion: Debates on a new Welfare State in Europe  
The European Social Model (ESM) is at the heart of the functioning of European economies 
and societies. Social Models are diverse in the EU, but European integration requests some 
coordination and convergence. We will give here two points of view. The first (from Wifo) 
suggests a new architecture of welfare state in Europe, inspired by the Scandinavian model, so 
the impact of social protection as a productive factor increases.. The second (from OFCE)  
stresses the importance of guaranteeing social cohesion in the Member States, by reducing 
income inequalities and ensuring a high level of social protection, in particular for people who 
cannot work, because of their age, their handicap, their family situation or the economic 
situation. The disincentive effect of social protection is judged of second order and it is 
considered that rich countries can accept it.  
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Key elements of a New Welfare State Architecture4  
European societies are facing a number of demanding challenges, which will intensify in the 
years to come and call for institutional reforms in European welfare systems: There is, on the 
one hand, from a societal perspective, a process of individualisation going on that is related to 
women's growing preferences for personal independence and life long careers. This process 
entails substantial changes in demographic and family behaviour which results in new and 
more flexible family arrangements, meaning a declining number of children living together 
with both mother and father and an increasing number of single-parent families. This 
development mirrors new insecurities and increasing poverty risks. 
On the other hand, looking at the economy and the labour market, processes of global 
integration, technological transformation and structural economic change are going on which 
result in a shift from production to knowledge-intensive service economies creating new risks 
on the labour market. While the number of decently paid and secure jobs of low- and 
medium-skilled standard production workers are rapidly declining, a dualistic perspective on 
the labour market is unfolding: The main route is in favour of skilled and highly professional, 
well-paid jobs, but at the other end a sizeable market of precarious jobs for those with weak 
human capital facing either low wages or unemployment. At the same time the pressure to 
increase wage disparities continues to rise (Reich, 1991). 
To prevent a bleak perspective of life-long precariousness and rising poverty risks for an 
increasing number of people, our societies have to provide, on the one hand a highly efficient 
education system which leaves nobody behind and fosters life-long learning as well as strong 
mobility opportunities on the labour market and, on the other hand, a system of social security 
with a tight safety net at the low-income end but strong activating incentives and supportive 
instruments, e.g., active labour market policy. In knowledge-intensive post–industrial 
economies individuals’ life chances depend on their learning abilities and their accumulation 
of human capital. Hence, the impact of social inheritance will become of utmost importance - 
“in particular with regard to cognitive development and educational attainment” as Esping-
Andersen (2002, p. 3) pointed out. And he proceeded:  “..we cannot afford not to be 
egalitarians in the advanced economies of the twenty-first century. ….there is a very good 
argument that equality of opportunities and life chances is becoming sine qua non for 
efficiency … Our human capital constitutes the single most important resource that we must 
mobilise in order to ensure a dynamic and competitive knowledge economy. We are facing 
huge demographic imbalances with very small working age cohorts ahead, and to sustain the 
elderly we must maximise the productivity of the young.”  
While the post-war welfare states mainly concentrated on equalising living conditions by 
supporting the victims of destructive outcomes of market forces through income maintenance 
guarantees, the policy challenge of the future is to empower people to be adequately equipped 
to satisfy their welfare needs within the market. Thus, social policy – as seen by the Lisbon 
agenda - is about to become a productive resource; i.e. a supply side policy instrument to 
empower and activate people to be able to succeed in the market.  
The Lisbon growth strategy is based on three ambitious objectives: making Europe a zone of 
economic prosperity, with a high level of social protection and a responsibility in terms of 
                                                 
4 From Aloïs Guger, Thomas Leoni and Ewald Walterskirchen (Wifo). 
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environment. If one considers that these three objectives are linked and that European 
construction should aim at a progressive unification of European Societies, then European 
construction should aim at making the European social models converge towards a single one. 
Increasing economic efficiency in Europe, facilitating changes and strengthening investments 
important for the future should be accompanied by a determined social policy. If one 
considers that the continental model lacks flexibility, that the Liberal model is too costly in 
terms of social cohesion and inequalities, then Europe should move towards a Scandinavian 
model, knowing that the task will not be easy because institutions and traditions that have 
paved the way for the success of these models does not exist in other countries or not to the 
same extent.  
The Scandinavian system remains inclusive and tight, but social benefits are partly made 
dependent on the input of the individual and transfers become conditional on certain 
obligations; replacement rates are lower than they used to be in order to provide stronger 
incentives to work but are still high by international standards. Scandinavian countries turned 
out to be the best performers in combining a high level of equality and low poverty rates with 
high levels of employment and high economic growth (section II). Accordingly, they seem to 
be best prepared to tackle the emerging societal and economic challenges of the future.  
As key elements for a new welfare state architecture we pick out:  
– ‘A child-centred and women-friendly social investment strategy’, as Esping-Andersen 
(2002) has proposed. This strategy can be seen as the backbone of an activating reform 
which takes into account the preconditions of a highly flexible, knowledge-intensive 
society with high activity rates of economically independent men and women. While post-
war welfare states provided both a high degree of income security and, together with 
marital stability, sufficient caring facility within the traditional family, young families 
today have a less stable life-course perspective both economically as well as in their 
partnership. At the same time, the prerequisites for a good life and working career are 
rising steadily. Life chances depend increasingly on investment in human capital by both 
parents and society in early childhood. Good cognitive abilities which have to be 
developed in early childhood are absolute preconditions for educational attainment and 
life-long learning. 
– For demographic reason as well as due to the high cognitive requisites of a 
‘knowledge economy’, we cannot afford to leave any child behind in her intellectual 
development. Accordingly, one of the key goals of reform strategies is to reduce social 
inheritance and to improve the cognitive potential of every child, irrespective of her social 
origin. Thus, policies aimed at improving the availability of affordable high-quality child-
care facilities in early childhood as well as policies to prevent child poverty and safeguard 
welfare must be seen as social investments which are central pillars of any activating 
welfare state reform. 
– Together with higher working-time flexibility and part-time employment possibilities, the 
availability of high-quality and affordable care facilities for both children and elderly is 
also an important precondition for parents and – in particular for women – to find their 
life-work balance in combining family obligations with individual career preferences. In 
the face of demographic ageing this is an increasingly important issue for both increasing 
fertility rates and women’s labour market participation. Improving the relative income of 
families with children should also contribute to bring fertility rates back to satisfactory 
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levels. 
– High investment in human capital to increase educational attainment and literacy levels 
among younger cohorts and to institutionalise life-long learning to improve the likelihood 
of attending successful retraining at advanced ages, thus reducing one of the barriers to 
labour market participation of older workers.  
– Increasing social services. The welfare state of the future will have to provide more 
service to meet the requirements of more individualistic societies and service economies. 
By providing sufficient high quality care facilities for children, the aged and the 
handicapped the state empowers people to combine gainful employment with family 
obligation, thus fostering (female) participation, welfare production and equality in the 
modern ageing society.  
– A 'flexicurity' strategy or managed and balanced flexibility on the labour market. 
Increasing competition in goods and labour market due to world-wide economic 
integration as well as rapid technological and structural changes demand higher labour 
market flexibility. To prevent poverty risks, higher standards of social security are needed. 
Here, the Nordic – in particular Danish – experiences with 'flexicurity' offer examples of 
good practise by combining, on the one hand, deregulation on the labour market with 
extensive active labour market policy and, on the other hand, generous income protection 
in the case of unemployment paired with strong incentives to resume employment fast.  
– Government and public institutions have to play a proactive role in promoting 
competition, innovation, efficiency and structural change. Technology policy and 
enhancing the adoption of new technologies are fostering growth and welfare. Industries 
hurt by globalisation must be restructured or the reconversion of their workers must be 
supported. This contradicts the approach that governments just need to deregulate markets 
and wait for the innovation and growth rebound expected to automatically follow.  
Preservation and development of the European Social model5 
Maintaining and developing the ESM is part of European Construction and is as important as 
the Internal Market. The ESM should have a precise content which needs to be politically 
debated. The ESM should include: 
– In terms of pensions, a minimum income for the elderly and a decent replacement rate for 
workers at low or medium wage earnings. 
– Retirement legislation ensuring that older workers, whom firms do not want to employ 
any more, do not fall into poverty. That implies that disability and early retirement 
schemes should not restricted before that full employment would be not assured and that 
firms would accepted to retain or to hire workers seniors. This also implies that the 
retirement reforms take in account the discrepancies between manual workers and 
managers, as concern life expectation and work capacities at 60 years. 
– Health insurance available to all, either through a universal or an occupational insurance 
system associated with free health insurance entitlement to the poor. The control of health 
spending must be based on medical criteria or controls the income of health professionals, 
not by market mechanisms. 
                                                 
5 From Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak (OFCE). 
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– A minimum income. .  
– Unemployment allowances ensuring a minimum income and a satisfactory replacement 
ratio for low or medium wage workers. 
– Family benefits ensuring a minimum living standard for children and a satisfactory living 
standard for families relative to single people.  
– Childcare benefits and collective infrastructure supporting female employment, especially 
for mothers with young children.   
– Some degree of product market regulation to ensure that universal public services are 
provided..  
– Some employment protection legislation to ensure that companies invest in their workers 
and that workers invest in their company 
– A tax system targeting the reduction of income inequalities.  
An ambitious social and economic policy needs to be financed. This requires leaving the MS 
the possibility to decide of their company and personal taxation, thus implementing a strategy 
of taxation coordination in Europe  
The evolution of European systems must be done under the impulse of a democratic OMC, 
with a larger involvement of national social partners. Minimum social standards, increasing 
with the economic development of countries, should support convergence.  
There is a need for an active and contra-cyclical macroeconomic policy in order to maintain 
full employment. This will request a robust demand (in particular through low interest rates 
and an appropriate exchange rate level), coordinated policy measures to address imbalances 
between countries (which will prevent non-cooperative strategies). The Stability Pact will 
need to be reconsidered to allow governments to borrow to invest in order to support growth. 
Being close to full employment is a prerequisite for efficient strategies of work incentives for 
older workers, the disabled and the unemployed.  
Europe should try to design a specific model of European firms, caring about jobs, regional 
activity and sustainable growth.. This requests that Member States maintain a relatively high 
level of company taxation to give them incentives to: build homogeneous infrastructure in the 
country, subsidise firms locating their production in areas in difficulty, supporting economic 
sectors in difficulty and subsidising R&D.  
Two issues are more difficult to deal with: 
– Should Europe open more widely its frontiers to immigration in order to compensate for 
demographics slowdown? This would mean keeping unskilled jobs and some social 
inequalities (as in the case of the US and Anglo-Saxon countries)? Or should Europe aim 
first of all at maintaining full-employment, to raise skills levels and facilitate the reduction 
in unskilled jobs? 
– Should everything be done to bring older people, disabled people and mothers with young 
children back to work? Yes, of course, because a job is socially rewarding and is a means 
of integration in the Society. But such a policy may entail a reduction in living standards 
for the targeted groups of the population who do not succeed to find a job. Also, is any job 
valuable? Is it necessarily socially useful? Productivity gains should be partly used to 
reduce working time and to decrease the importance of work. 
The improvement of the European economic framework and the development of the Social 
Europe are not technical issues. They require a major change in the economic policy thinking, 
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a new alliance between social classes concerned about full employment and social cohesion, 
the willingness to depart from the financial markets and multinational firms point of view. It 
would be easier to undertake at the European than at a National level, but it would require an 
agreement between peoples of each EMU Member State, which would be difficult to reach.  
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